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All induction is blind, so long as the deduction ofcausal connections
is left out ofaccount; and all deduction is barren, so long as it does
not start from observation.
John Neville Keynes 1890, 164
5.1 Introduction
The behavior offixed investment is one ofthe four core topics (along
with consumption, money demand, and the Phillips curve) that have
dominated theoretical and empirical research in macroeconomics dur-
ing the postwar era. An understanding of the sources of persistent
swings in investment spending seems to be a key ingredient in any
satisfactory explanation ofbusiness cycles. This paper develops a new
data set and uses a new methodology to investigate the behavior of
household and business fixed investment in the United States since
1919. Its results have implications for at least four partly overlapping
groups of economists who have strong views about the nature of the
fixed investment process and, indirectly, about the sources ofbusiness
cycles.
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Keynesians, following the General Theory, regard investment be-
havior as containing a substantial autonomous component; investment
responds to the stateofbusiness confidence and incorporates the effect
of episodes of speculation and overbuilding. The instability and un-
predictability offixed investment behavior, ofcourse, forms the basis
of Keynesian support for an activist and interventionist role for gov-
ernment fiscal policy. A crucial and often unstated component of the
Keynesian view is that these autonomous investment movements ex-
hibit positive serial correlation and last long enough for government
action to be effective.
In contrast, monetarists do not single out investment for special
attention. Changes in aggregate private spending, consumption and
investment alike, are attributed to prior fluctuations in the supply of
money. Since monetarists are usually reluctant to provide detailed
structural interpretations ofwhat happens inside the black box through
which the influence of money is channeled to economic activity, they
are not concerned whether the primary channel runs through con-
sumption, investment, orboth. But monetarists would expect(ifforced
uncharacteristically to devote special attention to fixed investment be-
havior) to find a strong role for the money supply as a primary deter-
minant ofinvestment behavior.
In addition to the general approaches to macroeconomic analysis
advocated by Keynesians and monetarists, two additional groups of
economists have made a special effort to understand investment be-
havior. The "neoclassical" school, represented by the work of Jor-
genson and his collaborators, emphasizes changes in the relative price
or"usercost" ofcapitalas a dominant influence, togetherwith changes
in output, on fluctuations in fixed investment. The user cost ofcapital
is the primarychannelby which bothmonetary policy (working through
interest rates) and fiscal policy (working through investment tax in-
centives) influence the flow of investment spending. The final group
consists ofadvocates ofTobin's "Q" approach, in which the influence
on investment of forward-looking expectations regarding output and
capital costs is captured by a single variable, Q, the ratio ofthe market
value of capital to its reproduction cost. Since the dominant portion
offluctuations in Qis accounted for by changes in stock market prices,
proponents ofthis approach expect econometric work to single out the
stock market as an important (or dominant) factor explaining invest-
ment behavior.
Becauseofthe long time spanofdatacoveredin the empirical portion
of this paper, its results have implications for the sources of business
cycles in general and ofthe Great Depression in particular. Keynesians
view business cycles as the inevitable reflection of the instability of
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to reduce the amplitude of cycles. Keynesian interpretations of the
Great Depression, especially Temin (1976), minimize the role of mon-
etary factors in the first two years of the 1929-33 contraction. Mon-
etarists reverse the roles ofthe government and private sectorand view
the basic source of business cycles as autonomous and largely unex-
plained fluctuations in the money supply that lead to fluctuations in
private spending. A reduction in the amplitude of business cycles re-
quires a reduction in the instability originating in government manage-
ment of the money supply.
The neoclassical and Q approaches to the explanation ofinvestment
behavior are explicitly partial equilibrium in nature and have not been
developed into broadertheories ofthe business cycle. The neoclassical
approach is compatible with some aspects ofmonetarism, since insta-
bility ininvestmentcanoriginatefrom governmentcontroloverinterest
rates and investment tax incentives. But the policy implications differ
from those of monetarism; to the extent that the monetarist recom-
mendation ofa constant monetary growth rate rule would increase the
volatility of interest rates, then the neoclassicists would predict the
consequence to be greater rather than lesser fluctuations in investment
spending. The Q advocates have not addressed themselves to business
cycle implications, but their approach creates a natural link to those
(like Mishkin 1978) who emphasize the role of the 1929 stock market
crash in the Great Depression.
The conflict between the Keynesian and monetarist approaches can
be related to the distinction in business cycle analysis between "im-
pulses" and "propagation mechanisms." Keynesians argue for activist
monetary and fiscal policy responses to counter serially correlated
investment impulses, while monetarists view investment as part ofthe
propagation mechanism that carries the influence ofautonomous money
supply impulses from their origin in the government sector to their
effect on private sector spending.1 The Keynesian/monetarist debate
can be translated into the modern econometric language of Granger
causality and innovation accounting. Keynesians would expect to find
a large role for "own innovations" in the empirical explanation of
investment spending, with a relatively small role for feedback from
monetary variables. An extreme Keynesian would expect investment
to be exogenous in the Granger sense to prior changes in the money
supply, and the same expectation would be held by neoclassicists and
Q advocates, none of whom (to our knowledge) has ever entered the
money supply directly as an explanatory variable in an empirical in-
I. Recall the famous debate ofthe mid-1960s setoffby the attempt by Milton Friedman
and David Meiselman (1963) to characterize "autonomous spending" and "the money
supply," respectively, as the driving forces in the Keynesian model and their own model
of income determination.270 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
vestment equation. Monetarists, of course, would expect to find that
the money supply is Granger causally prior to fixed investment.
This paperreopens the questionofexogeneity in investmentbehavior
by inquiring whetherthe standardapproach to the estimationof''struc-
tural" investment equations leads to an overstatement of the endo-
geneity ofinvestment spending. Its primary objective is to decompose
fluctuations in fixed investment into three components: (a) feedback
from policy variables and from noninvestment spending; (b) the prop-
agation mechanism imparted by the investment process itself, which
displays a high degree of positive serial correlation; and (c) "own
innovations" or "shocks" in fixed investmentexpenditures thatremain
after accounting for (a) and (b). The main contributions of the paper
can be divided into three categories-methodological, data creation,
and empirical.
The methodological section finds that, while structural model build-
ing exercises may be useful in suggesting lists of variables that might
play an explanatory role in investment equations, they generally achieve
identification of structural parameters only by imposing arbitrary and
unbelievable simplifying assumptions and exclusion restrictions. Con-
sideration of real world decision making suggests that economic ag-
gregates play "multiple roles" in investment behavior, which implies
that the observed coefficients on explanatory variables in equations
describing investment behavior represent a convolution of numerous
structural parameters that cannot be separately identified. As a result
it is possible only to estimate reduced forms.
The estimation methodology suggested here is the same as that
proposed in a previous paper on inflation (Gordon and King 1982). It
starts with guidance from traditional structural models on the choice
and form of explanatory variables to be included. Then estimation is
carried out in a format similar to that ofthe unconstrained "Simsian"
vector autoregression (VAR) models. Explanatory variables are typi-
cally entered with unconstrained lags of the same length, and the list
of explanatory variables typically includes a mixture of those sug-
gested by several structural models, together with those that may not
be suggested by any structural model but might in principle play a
role through real wealth effects, credit constraints, or expectation
formation (e.g., the real money supply). The approach differs from
the usual VAR model building exercise by focusing mainly on equa-
tions for the variable ofprimary interest (inflation in Gordon and King
and investment expenditures in this paper) rather than by giving "equal
time" to all the variables in the model. It is less "atheoretical" than
most VAR research, because structural models retain a usefulness in
suggesting lists of candidate variables to be included in reduced-form271 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
equations and the form in which those variables should be entered (in
this paper, for instance, stock market prices enter in the form of
Tobin's Q variable), even if the underlying structural parameters can-
not be identified.
The second contribution is the use ofa new set ofquarterly data for
major expenditure categories ofGNP extending back to 1919. The data
file also contains quarterly data back to 1919 for other variables that
have been suggested as explanatory "candidates" in investment equa-
tions. These include the capital stock, interest rates, the cost ofcapital
including tax incentive effects, a proxy for Tobin's Q, and the real
money supply.
Equipped with its hybrid methodology and its extended data set, the
paper then proceeds to empirical estimation. The empirical section
differs from the usual research on investment that typically attempts
to measure response parameters within the contextofa single structural
theory, for example, neoclassical or Q. Instead, our skepticism that
structural parameters can be estimated leads us to estimate reduced-
form equations. These include explanatory variables suggested by sev-
eral theories and can be used to decompose the variance ofinvestment
within particular historical periods among the contribution of lagged
values ofexplanatory variables (output, interest rates, money, Q), the
contribution of lagged investment, and "own innovations" to invest-
ment. The analysis of shocks to investment links this paper to the
debate between Temin (1976), Thomas Mayer (1980), and others on the
role ofan autonomous shock to consumption in 1930, and to papers in
this volume by Hall on shifts in the consumption function and by
Blanchard and Watson on "shocks in general." Our extended data set
also allows us to investigate changes in investment behavior between
the interwar and postwar periods.
The discussion begins (section 5.2) with a review ofthe central issues
that lead to our choice ofa reduced-form rather than a structural ap-
proach. This is not a full-blown survey of the literature, but rather a
selective analysis of problems with structural estimation that have
emerged over the past twenty years. Then section 5.3 introduces the
data set and describes the behavior of the major variables in each of
the fourteen business cycles since 1919, as well as over longer sub-
periods. Section 5.4 presents the estimated equations for four cate-
gories ofinvestment(producers' durable equipment, nonresidential and
residential structures, and consumer durables expenditures), and sec-
tion 5.5 offers a study of multivariate causality and exogeneity, inno-
vation accounting, and a historical decomposition of the sources of
investment spending. Section 5.6 summarizes the main results and
implications.272 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
5.2 Pitfalls in Structural Estimation of Investment Equations
Most of the investment literature is concerned solely with business
investment. This orientation reflects the influence ofKeynes's General
Theory, especially its preoccupation with the state of business confi-
dence as a determinant of investment plans. However, business in-
vestment constitutes less than half of total private investment in the
United States economy. Consumerexpenditures on durable goods have
been larger than producers' durable equipment expenditures since 1920,
and residential structures expenditures have exceeded those on non...
residential investment in at least half the years since 1929.
One might expect household investment behavior to respond to dif-
ferent variables than does business investment. For instance, ifa sub-
stantial proportion ofconsumers are credit constrained, then episodes
of "credit crunches" are liable to produce a greater response in the
investment outlays of consumers than of businessmen.2 A systematic
exploration of household investment behavior may need to explore
factors that matter in household decision making; for example, it may
be disposable income that matters for households but total GNP for
businessmen, and the various tax incentive terms conventionally in-
cluded in measures of the user cost of capital may matter for busi-
nessmen but not for households. Here we begin with a critique of the
more familiar literature on business investmentand subsequently apply
our analysis to the determinants of household investment.
Chirinko's (1983a) systematic review ofassumptions and results dis-
tinguishes four classes of econometric models describing business in-
vestment behavior-Jorgenson's neoclassical approach, Tobin's Q, the
"general forward-looking" approach based on explicit modeling ofex-
pectations, and Feldstein's "return-over-cost" and "effectivetaxrate"
models. Because they have accountedfor the vast majority ofempirical
studies completed to date, we concentrate only on the neoclassical and
Q frameworks for investment research. Extended surveys are pre-
sented by Eisner and Strotz (1963), Jorgenson (1971), Helliwell (1976),
and Chirinko (1983a), whereas here we treat only a few selected issues
that lead to our skepticism that traditional structural parameters can
be identified.
5.2.1 The Neoclassical Paradigm
As ofthe mid-1970s, the neoclassical paradigm was so dominant (at
least outside New Haven) that Helliwell's (1976) survey makes no
mention of any other framework. Before the mid-1960s, investment
equations had been dominated by the accelerator approach and had
2. The quantitative importance of the credit crunch phenomenon is explored in the
paper by Eckstein and Sinai in this volume (chap. 1).273 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
added interest rates, profits, or other variables as determinants of in-
vestment without explicit constraints based on optimizing behavior.
The studies initiated by Jorgenson and collaborators, particularly Jor-
genson (1963, 1967), Hall and Jorgenson (1967, 1971), and Jorgenson
and Stephenson (1967, 1969), are distinguished by their derivation of
the desired capital/output ratio from specific assumptions about be-
havior and about the form ofthe production function. The centerpiece
in the determination of the desired capital stock is the expected real
rental price of capital services, which is equated with the expected
marginal product ofcapital. Iffactors are paid their marginal products
and the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, the desired
capital stock at a given point in time (Kf) is a linear function ofexpected
output (Xr) divided by the expected real price ofcapital services (Cr/Pr):
(1)
where ~ is the income share ofcapital in output. Decision and delivery
lags make actual net investment a distribut.ed lag on past changes in
the desired capital stock:
(2)
J
If = L ujaKf_j·
j=O
When the expected variables (pe, Xe, and (:'e) are replaced by current
actual values (an unjustified assumption discussed below), and when
the demand for replacement capital is represented by a fixed geometric
depreciation factor (8) times the lagged capital stock (Kt - l), the neo-
classical investment model becomes:
(3)
J
It = 0.0 + L~ja(PX/C)t-j + 8Kt- 1 + Et·
j=O
Equation (3) embodies a number of strong assumptions and restric-
tions, and a large "counterrevolution" literature has developed to ex-
plore the consequences of loosening them. The "pure" Jorgensonian
neoclassical approach assumes a "putty/putty" technology without
adjustment costs; the capital stock can be adjusted instantly, trans-
formed, bought, or sold as needed to bring a firm's actual capital stock
into line with its desired capital stock. As long as expectations are
assumed to be static, the only justification for the lag distribution in-
cluded in (3) is the technological gestation lag. Another interpretation
is that investment expenditures involve adjustment costs. Without ad-
justment costs or gestation lags, the Jorgenson model is subject to the
criticism that whenever a gap exists between Kf and K o the rate of
investment will be infinitely large and the gap will be eliminated in-274 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
stantaneously. However, with eitherofthese assumptions "tackedon,"
the Jorgensonian Kf is not derived from a complete cost minimization
problem and is probably not optimal.3
Anotherpeculiarityofthe approachis apparentin equation(1), which
allows the desired capital stock to be a function only of the relative
price ofcapital rather than the relative price ofall inputs. Yellen (1980)
has shown that (1) can be derived only by assuming that real wages
are inversely related to C/P and respond fully and instantaneously to
any changes in C/P. As a result, all factor price changes must be
assumed to leave the profitability of the firm unaffected, even in the
short run. Thus the neoclassical approach leaves no room for theories
that predict a profit squeeze, investment slump, and growth slowdown
following a period ofexcessive real wage growth (see Malinvaud 1982).
However, even ifone were to accept the formulation in (1) with the
single relative price variable, the measurement ofcapital's user cost is
fraught with ambiguity. As shown recently in Auerbach's (1983) survey,
taxes and inflation may not change the cost ofcapital in the same way
for all firms, leaving the feasibility of aggregation an open question.
Simple formulas for C/P are also elusive when markets are incomplete
and when managers use financial leverage and dividend policy to in-
fluence market perceptions.
The empirical "counterrevolution" begins with Eisner and Nadiri
(1968), an article that takes particular exception to the multiplicative
specificationin (3) thatforces both the short-runandlong-run responses
to X and C/P to be identical. Eisner and Nadiri find that the elasticities
with respect to output are considerably higher than those with respect
to relative prices, and Bischoff (1971) finds that lags are shorter on
output than on relative prices. Chirinko and Eisner (1983) find in ex-
periments with the Data Resources, Incorporated (DRI) and MIT-
Penn-Social Science Research Council (MPS) econometric models that
splitting apart the X and C/P variables can cause the implicit relative
price elasticity to fall by more than half, and together with minor re-
definitions of the C/P variable can cause a reduction in that elasticity
by a factor offour. However, even by loosening restrictions in this way
they find that response coefficients to changes in the investment tax
credit in six models still vary by a factor offour (or a factor of about
two for the four most extensively used models-Chase, DRI, MPS,
and Wharton).
5.2.2 Expectations and Identification
An even more serious problem in equations (1) through (3) is the
cavalier treatment of expectations, which are included in (1) but as-
3. This paragraph reflects an oral history provided to us by Fumio Hayashi.275 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
sumed to be static in the transition from (1) to (3). In Helliwell's words,
"This important issue has been dealt with principally by the handy
assumption that the future will be like the present" (1976, 15). At best,
expectations of future output are allowed to depend on a distributed
lag ofpast values ofoutput, but generally lagged values ofother vari-
ables that might be relevantfor expectationsformation (e.g., the money
supply) have been excluded as an identification restriction. Since in-
vestment is a forward looking activity, not only must the X and CIP
variables be represented by expectations that in principle should de-
pend on an information set containing past values ofall relevant mac-
roeconomic aggregates, but also the functional parameters entering the
investment model should depend on the same general information set.
This point can be illustrated in a generalization of a simple model
set forth recently by Andrew Abel and Olivier Blanchard (1983) that
falls into the class of "general forward looking models." In place of
(1) we allow the desired capital stock to depend on a sequence of
expected future sales, with a discount factor <T; unlike Abel and Blan-
chard, we also allow the desiredcapitalstocktodependonthe sequence
ofexpected future rental rates (CIP):4
00
(4) Kf+n = a(1 - <T) L<TiE{F[Xt+n+i,(CIP)t+n+JIOt}.
i=O
Here t is the time an investment order is placed for delivery at t + n,
with n the length of the delivery or gestation lag. The parameter a is
the steady-state ratio ofcapital to output, and 0t is the information set
relevant at time t to the formation of expectations about all future
variables. The relevant information set might, for instance, include past
values of output, the interest rate, and the money supply.
It has been an almost universal practice in the empirical literature
to express the depreciation rate of capital as a fixed exponential con-
stant. IncontrastEisner(1972), Feldsteinand Foot(1971), and Feldstein
and Rothschild (1974) have argued that the timing of replacement in-
vestment is an economic decision and is motivated by economic con-
siderations. In particular, fixed proportions in building or machine con-
struction create an enormous incentive for net investment and
replacement investment to be considered as part ofthe same economic
decision making process.5 Accordingly we replace the fixed replace-
4. Even ifa project is financed by issuing a long-term bond on the day ofits completion,
time periods after the date of completion are relevant both for the taxation of earnings
and for any capital gains that may accrue.
5. Students of United States twentieth-century architecture know that there was vir-
tually no central city office building construction between 1930 and 1955; that is, there
was neither any expansion in the number of square feet nor any replacement of old
buildings, both for the same set of reasons.276 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
ment rate in the Abel/Blanchard model by an expected rate (0) that
depends on the information set:
(5) Kt+n = [1 - E(010t)]Kt+n- 1 + It+n,
where It + n represents investment expenditures made at time 1 + n
(strictly speaking this should be an expectation-see note 6 below).
Investment orders depend on the gap between desired and actual
capital that is expected to occur at time 1 + n and the present expec-
tation of the fraction of the capital stock that will be replaced at that
time. Although the fraction ofthe gap to be closed is decided at time
1and is not an expected value, today's decision regarding the fraction
depends on the expected cost of adjustment during the period of the
gestation lag, for example, expected interest rates on short-term con-
struction loans, 't: 6
(6) 0t = X[E(rt+ 110t)][K1+n - Kt+n- tl + E(010t)Kt+n- 1 + ~t,
where ~t is a disturbance term.
Finally, actual investment expenditures (It) are a sum ofpast orders,






Here in (7) for completeness we allow the Wj coefficients to depend on
the information set, thus introducing the possibility that orders may be
canceled before delivery or that the gestation lag is influenced by the
evolution of the economy between time periods 1 - j and 1.7 Thus it
n
appears that the Abel/Blanchard assumption that L Wj = 1 is unreal-
istically restrictive. j=O
It is obvious from inspection of equations (4) through (7) that in
principle it is not possible to identify structural coefficients on current
and lagged economic aggregates in an aggregate investment equation,
because any of those aggregates could be playing double, triple, or
even more complex roles as ingredients in the information sets Ot. The
reduced form involves complicated convolutions of the variables en-
6. To be consistent with the rest of the formulation, the term "Kt +n - 1" in equation
(6) should be an expectation, not an actual value. This approximation is adopted to
simplify the reduced-form equation in (8) below.
7. As an example, airlines that ordered the Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft in 1978 reacted
to the previously unexpected period ofpoor profits that occurred during 1980-82 both
by canceling part or all of their orders and by "stretching out" the delivery period.
American Airlines initially ordered both the 757 and the 767, but it canceled its entire
orderfor 757 aircraft. United Airlines has stretched the delivery dates on halfofits 767
order by up to five years and has finally canceled that half.277 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
tering the information set, which appears in five places in the reduced
form:
n
(8) It LWJ{Ot){~[E[rt+1IOt)][a(1 - (1)
j=O
00
L(1iE(F[Xt+n+i,(C/P)t+n+JIOt) - (I - E(OIOt-j-l))Kt+n-j- 2
i=O
- It+n-j-tl + E(OIOt-j)Kt+n-j- 1 + ~t-j}'
The research by Abel and Blanchard (1983) provides a good example
ofthe arbitrary assumptions and simplifications needed to achieve iden-
tification in a model like equations (4) through (7). Theirproblems occur
despite a much simpler framework that differs by (a) excluding the
rental price from any appearance, even in determining the desired
capital stock; (b) allowing expectations based on an information set
only with regard to the sequence ofexpectedfuture output; (c) allowing
only past values ofsales to be included in that information set; and (d)
assuming fixed values ofall other parameters. Further, Abel and Blan-
chard have two additional types of data not available in this historical
study of aggregate expenditures: (e) separate data on orders and ex-
penditures and (j) sectoral data that allow a distinction between ag-
gregate and sectoral sales. Despite these differences, Abel and Blan-
chard achieve identification of a structural model only by assuming
arbitrary fixed values ofseveralparameters, and they find no conclusive
evidence for preferring the resulting structural model to the corre-
sponding reduced form. 8
In our application to a set ofaggregate data, the more general model
in equations (4) through (7) does not appear to allow the identification
of structural parameters. For instance, consider the role of interest
rates and stock prices. Both seem to be relevant information for eco-
nomic agents forming expectations about future output, not to mention
future interest rates and stock prices (both components ofthe Jorgen-
sonian rental price). Yet how is the estimated coefficient on a lagged
interest rate variable to be disentangled to allow identification of sep-
arate roles that this variable plays in forming expectations in different
places in the model in affecting the desired capital stock, in affecting
the desired rate of replacement of old capital,and in affecting the
desired rate of closing the gap between desired and actual capital?
8. "For the information set containing also aggregate sales, the structural model per-
formed poorly, being unable to explain the relation-or the lack of relation-between
investment in a sector and aggregate sales.... The model... is clearly not structural;
some ofits maintained assumptions... are rejected by the data. Some ofthe additional
assumptions made in estimation . . . are rejected for some of the sectors. Nor are the
econometric results overwhelmingly supportive" (Abel and Blanchard 1983, 44).(9)
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5.2.3 The Q Approach
The expectations quagmire is inherent in the neoclassical approach,
with its identification of key parameters requiring ad hoc exclusion
restrictions in the set of variables allowed into the information set
influencing expectations. The''pure" Qapproachdiffers from theusual
investment accelerator by explaining investment activity on the basis
of deviations from portfolio balance, and by assuming from the start
that there is no "time to build," that is, that there are no gestation
lags, so that It = Ot. Net investment activity takes place when marginal
Q, the ratio of the increase in the value of the firm from acquiring an
additional unit ofcapital to its marginal purchase cost, exceeds unity.
Numerous authors, including Abel (1979) and Hayashi (1982), have
derived Qinvestment functions in the following form that adds lags to




= \flo + ~ J.Ls(Qt-s - 1) + et·
t s=o
The theoretical derivation involves "marginal Q," which is forward
looking and hence unobservable. Actual estimation of(9) involves re-
placing marginal Q with average Q, the ratio of the market value of
firms to the replacement cost oftheir assets. (Hayashi 1982 has shown
that actual and marginal Q are equal under specified assumptions but
does not test whether these assumptions are empirically supported.) If
(9) is estimated for data on net investment, then the constant term \flo
should be zero, since net investment should be zero in the steady state
when Q is unity. When data on gross investment are used, then the
constant term implicitly measures the depreciation rate. At a Q ratio
ofunity, the firm should just replace its old capital but should not buy
any new capital. More generally, the constant term \flo reflects the mean
value of any omitted variables.
Muchofthediscussionofpossible problems in theQapproachrelates
to measurement errors in either the numerator (market value) or the
denominator (replacement cost) ofthe Qratio. For instance, firms may
not pay attention to every quarterly movement in securities prices,
given the possibility of excess volatility in financial markets (Shiller
1981). In addition Hall (1977) and Chirinko (1983b) have emphasized
the likelihood oferrors owing to the indirect measurement ofthe value
of stocks and bonds and to the fact that the value of a firm's shares
depends on everything owned by the corporations-notjusttheir phys-
ical capital but also intangible capital, natural resources, goodwill, mo-
9. Hall (1977, 88) shows that with a geometric delivery lag, only the current value of
Q enters. In the basic analysis ofAbel and Hayashi, only current Q enters, and gestation
lags are a special case.279 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
nopoly position, and firm specific human capital. The denominator of
the Q ratio is likely to be measured with error because ofthe absence
of a complete inventory of the capital actually in place and the need
for approximations that may ignore premature retirements (owing, for
instance, to changes in energy prices), and because ofmismeasurement
ofthe replacement price ofcapital owing to inadequate adjustment for
quality change.
To date empirical results with the Q model have been disappointing.
It does not perform as well in the 1970s as other alternatives (Clark
1979) and yields a relatively low R2 even when carefully adjusted for
tax effects (Summers 1981).10 One possible problem is illustrated by
the increases in energy prices after the two oil shocks of the 1980s.
These were followed by a sharp decline in the stock market and in
measured average Q, but not by a marked decline in investment. This
might reflect a production relation in which capital and energy are
substitutes, so that a higher relative price ofenergy induces new capital
investment.
Similarly, an episode of "wage push" that increases the share of
labor semipermanently could well reduce the Q ratio for a long time
by depressing the numerator much faster than the denominator can
adjust. Recall that the denominator is the replacement cost of capital,
measured as today's capital goods price index times a perpetual in-
ventory measure ofthe real capital stock. If the inflation rate is larger
than the retirement rate, the denominatorofthe Qratio can grow while
the numerator is falling. A decline in the stock market can occur when
higherpricesoflabororenergyeliminatethe profit earnedbyold plants,
but nevertheless firms may keep operating these plants as long as they
contribute more to cash flow than to variable cost (recent examples
include dinosaur steel plants recently closed by United States Steel or
the Boeing 707s finally grounded by TWA four years after the second
oil shock.)
Even if Q could somehow be measured accurately, with a correct
measure of capital actually in place used to calculate the denominator
of the Q ratio, empirical tests of the theory would run aground on a
basic asymmetry in adjustment costs and gestation lags that seems to
have been ignored. An increase in Q above unity should induce positive
net investmentlimitedonly bythe size ofadjustmentcosts and delivery
lags, but a decrease in Qbelow unity induces negative net investment
subject to a quite different setofadjustment costs. Firms may not retire
capital until its cash flow falls to its variable cost, and there may be a
10. The poor postsample performance ofthe Q approach is illustrated by Clark (1979,
93). Since his article was written, a national accounts revision has substantially raised
the level of actual investment for the later 1970s, thus implying an even poorer perfor-
mance of the Q approach.280 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
long transition periodthatbrings withit the dangerofbankruptcybefore
this variable cost point is actually reached. Firms with little profit
making potential and with a near zero value on the stock market may
nonetheless have sufficient residual goodwill or monopoly power to be
able to keep themselves afloat by issuing debt, as has been so evident
in the airline industry. An implication is that a revival of industry
fortunes (owing, for instance, to a decline in energy prices) may cause
stock prices to soar without setting off an investment boom, as firms
concentrate on paying offdebt and restructuring their balance sheets.
Such portfolio arrangements can create considerable looseness be-
tween stock market movements and investment decisions. The same
looseness may occur in part because the evaluation of a company's
future formed by firm management differs from that formed by the
market. In graduate school we were first exposed to Paul Samuelson's
joke that "the stock market has predicted nine out of the last five
recessions," and we also have heard much from Modigliani and Cohn
(1979) and others about irrationality in market valuations. So it seems
no wonder that management should be as skeptical of the market's
verdict in making valuations as we economists have been. In a recent
survey of six hundred companies, Business Week found that 60% of
executives responding felt that the "real value" oftheir company was
underestimated by the stock market. 11
Our criticism of the Q theory has been based on asymmetric ad-
justment costs and possible irrationality or differences in opinion in
market valuations. It is related to the critique by Bosworth (1975),
which stresses that firms will pay little attention to Q because the stock
market fluctuates excessively whereas investment projects take time
to plan and construct. Bosworth's argument is criticized by Fischer
and Merton (1984), who deny that managers would ignore the stock
market even when granting Bosworth the extreme assumptions that
(a) there occurs a completely exogenous and irrational decline in the
stock market (with an accompanying increase in the expected return
on the stock market from 15% to 20%) while (b) firm managers' as-
sessments are "completely unaffected by such animal spirits and they
know with certainty the true objective probabilities" (that the expected
equilibrium real return is 15%; p. 39). Even in such a situation, Fischer
and Merton argue, the stockmarket would influence investment, since
rational managers would use retained earnings to purchase their own
or other firms' shares. Similarly, they would be reluctant to finance
newinvestmentsbyissuingequityatthedepressed stockmarketprices.
No doubt some firms are influenced by such considerations, but
others may forge ahead with new investment projects, for at least two
11. See "Companies Feel Underrated by Street," Business Week, 20 February 1984,
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reasons. First, animal spirits may influence the stock and bond markets
differently. The 1973-75 episode of collapsing stock market was ac-
companied by negative short-term ex post real interest rates and by
long-term real bond rates that were relatively low, judged either in
terms ofthe high contemporaneous inflation rate of 1974-75 or by the
average inflation rate of the period 1974-81 viewed retrospectively.
Thus firms may simply have switchedfrom equity to debt issue. Fischer
and Merton would contend that rational managers should have bor-
rowed short term to buy back their shares instead of planning new
investmentprojects, buttheir view seems to ignore the potentially large
costs of postponing investment projects.
Managers face a trade-off between the uncertain capital gains to be
made on purchase and subsequent resale oftheir own shares or those
of other firms and the less uncertain losses that would be incurred if
(given long lead times and gestation lags) new capacity were not con-
structed now in anticipation of the next period of prosperity and high
capacity utilization. The planning and implementation ofinvestment in
new plant and equipment may be an ongoing bureaucratic process
involving high costs of delay or postponement.
Surely the real world is characterized by both responses, with some
firms responding to a stockmarket slump that they believe is temporary
by choosing the buy-back route while others engage in friendly or
hostile takeover bids and still others continue with previously planned
investment projects. Fischer and Merton may argue correctly that the
stock market must make some difference to investment expenditures,
while we put forth the compatible argument that the stock market may
be used as just one piece ofinformation, in addition to the traditional
factors (expected output, rental prices, etc.). If this is a correct inter-
pretation, then the Q model, by including only the single Q variable,
as in equation (9), incorporates arbitrary exclusion restrictions just as
does the neoclassical paradigm. When Wt~ incorporate looser restric-
tions into both approaches, they melt together into a generalized re-
duced form in which output, interest rates, stock prices, the money
supply, tax rates, and other variables enter a model like equations (4)
through (7) in multiple roles, influencing desired capital, expectations,
desired adjustment speeds, and replacement rates.
5.2.4 Household Investment
Household investment is durable goods and residential structures
has received muchless attentionthanbusiness investmentin equipment
and structures.12 This neglect cannot bejustified by the share ofhouse-
hold fixed investment in GNP, since this share has been at least as large
12. There are exceptions, however, particularly for residential housing. See deLeeuw
(1971), Feldstein (1981), and Polinsky (1977).282 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
as that ofbusiness investment throughout the period 1919-83 and has
become relatively larger in the past two decades. Perhaps it is the
perception that household investment is passive rather than a driving
force in business cycles that has kept it in the background. Expendi-
tures onconsumerdurables andresidential structures, ratherthanbeing
treated on a par with business investment, enter into macroeconomic
model building mainly as a channel oftransmission ofmonetary policy
episodes ofdisintermediation and credit controls.
There are many parallels between the models used for consumer
expenditure and those used to explain business investment. Both the
simple Keynesian consumption/income relation and Friedman's per-
manent income hypothesis are close analogues to certain variants of
the accelerator hypothesis ofbusiness investment behavior. Lagged or
expected GNP is replaced as an explanatory variable by lagged or
expected disposable income in moving from business to consumer in-
vestment, but the mechanism remains the same. More recent attempts
at modeling the consumer's decision, such as Bernanke (1982), treat
optimal durable goods investment within the framework of intertem-
poral utility maximization under uncertainty. The resulting model closely
parallels the''business investment in the presenceofadjustmentcosts"
literature that originated with Lucas (1967). All models like Bernanke's
either implicitly or explicitly require consumers to form expectations
offuture values ofrelevant variables, leading to the same complications
(delivery lags, replacement timing) that occur for business investment
above in equation (8). As is the case in (8), the estimated coefficients
of the relevant time series variables are underidentified convolutions
of many structural parameters.
5.2.5 Relation to Other Critiques
Christopher Sims (1980a) presented a critique of traditional econo-
metric models and urged the profession to shift from structural esti-
mation to his atheoretical VARs. In a sense the preceding critique of
structural investment equations represents a special case of Sims's
more general critique. Both place particular emphasis on the fact that
any set of lagged variables may in principle influence expectations of
a variable, and that thus there is little justification for many of the
exclusion restrictions that are incorporated in traditional econometric
models. For instance, there is ample evidence that it is suboptimal to
form expectations ofreal outputusing only a univariate autoregression,
as in most empirical implementations of the neoclassical investment
model and in such recent papers as Abel and Blanchard (1983).13 In
13. Unrealistically restrictive assumptions regarding the set of variables admissible
into the information set pervade theoretical papers, notjust empirical tests. In a related283 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
contrast, our own recent work (Gordon 1983b) shows that nominal
GNP growth is associated with past changes in interest rates, the mon-
etary base, and the money multiplier, with different weights in each
postwar decade. And in another paper (Gordon 1982) we showed that,
for a given nominal GNP change, real output depends among other
things on its own lagged value, lagged inflation, lagged changes in real
energy prices, and variables to capture the effects ofgovernment price
control programs.
Despite the preceding critique of traditional investment equations
and its similarity to Sims's general critique, there is no need to go as
far as Sims in endorsing completely atheoretical VAR models. Consid-
eration of a reduced-form equation like (8), together with the long list
ofcandidate variables that might influence expectations, suggests that
degrees offreedom are likely to be exhausted even in a relatively large
data set like that used in this paper. VAR models estimated to date
usually involve short lists of aggregate variables without including in-
dividual categories ofexpenditure-for example, investment-or spe-
cial variables that might be important for a particular category.
Gordon and King (1982) recommend an econometric approach that
combines the VAR approach with the estimation ofreduced-form equa-
tions suggested by traditional theory. Both the reduced-form and VAR
approaches can be viewed as selecting different methods ofallocating
zero restrictions in the face ofscarce degrees offreedom. As with any
trade-off in economics, the best way to allocate these restrictions de-
pends on an assessment ofbenefits and cC'sts. The VAR technique, in
which every variable is included on the right-hand side ofevery equa-
tion with lag distributions ofequal length, is a useful tool for checking
traditional specifications and determining, for instance, whether stock
prices or the money supply "belong" in an investment equation. To
repeat ~ phrase frequently used in oral discussions by Sims, Shiller,
and others, the VAR technique is an efficient way to conduct "ex-
ploratory data analysis."
But reduced-form econoIrJLetrics must be guided by prior structural
analysis. Excessive pursuit ofsymmetry in the VAR approach can lead
an investigator to omit particular variables that may matter for one
equation but not others, for example, variables to measure the effect
paper John Taylor (1983) derives a model of investment with gestation lags that shares
with equations (4) and (6) the feature that current investment orders depend on expec-
tations of both future output and capital costs. Taylor is not concerned with the iden-
tification issues under discussion here, but he does choose to simplify his model, as do
Abel and Blanchard, by makingexpectations offuture outputdepend onlyonpastoutput,
and in addition he makes future capital cost depend only on future and past output. By
omitting the multiple roles for past financial variables in determining expectations of all
future variables, Taylor thus introduces prior simplifying restrictions that have no em-
pirical justification.284 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
ofthe wartime price controls in a study ofinflation or the investment
tax credit in a study ofinvestment behavior. Gordon and King (1982;
and in more detail King 1983) have concluded that specifications used
in some VAR applications have been cavalier about detrending and
have tended to yield estimates that mix secular and cyclical effects and
can result in biased coefficients.
The general Simsian critique, and our particular critique of the in-
vestment literature, seems to point to estimation ofhighly unrestricted
and unconstrained specifications. Both appear to move in the opposite
direction from econometric work set in motion by the Lucas (1976)
critique, which has embarked on the task ofestimating parameters "at
deep levels ofchoice-for example, parameters ofutility and produc-
tion functions-that remain invariant in the face of changes in policy
rules. As yet this line ofresearch, represented, for instance, by Hansen
and Singleton (1982), has not yet provided convincing time series char-
acterizations ofthe major macroeconomic variables that might be com-
pared with traditional explanations. Further, applications of the Han-
sen/Singleton methodology appear to achieve "identification via an
'incredible' disturbance assumption," according to a recent critique by
Peter Garber and Robert King (1983).
5.2.6 The Hybrid Methodology: Blending Structure with
VAR Reduced Forms
The central role of investment fluctuations in business cycles has
spawned an enormous number of papers that estimate structural in-
vestment equations in which unconvincing simplifications and exclu-
sion restrictions have been introduced to achieve identification. Often
the focus is on persuading the reader that the author's favorite ex-
planatory variable is statistically significant, or that some other au-
thor's favorite variable is insignificant. Our skepticism regarding the
multiple roles played by aggregate time series variables, and our doubt
that any proxy for Tobin's Q can adequately summarize all the influ-
ences on investment appropriations and expenditures, leads us to
estimate reduced-form equations. Our point of departure is a list of
"candidate" explanatory variables that has been suggested in pre-
vious theoretical research. Our basic emphasis is on determining which
variables play an important role in the investment process and how
much of the variance of investment remains to be attributed to
"innovations.',
The methodological approach adopted here is similar to that previ-
ously applied to the econometric explanation ofinflation behavior. This
line ofresearch has proved fruitful in developing an inflation equation
that over the postwar period appears to remain relatively stable and
that, when estimated for the period before 1981, seems able to track28S Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
reasonably well the sharp disinflation that has occurred since then. 14
Insights of previous structural models are used to develop the list of
explanatoryvariables andto emerge witha specification thatintroduces
a few more constraints than typically appear in "pure" VAR models.
The equation can be used to test for the exogeneity of particular sets
oflagged variables in the inflation process, for temporal stability, and
for biases in one set of coefficients that result from the omission of
another variable. They can be used to identify significant shifts in sets
oflagged coefficients between one period and another. However, what
has beenlostin the inflationequationliterature, andcannotberegained,
is the ability to use particular coefficients to identify specific aspects
of the behavior oflabor markets as opposed to product markets. IS
The specification ofthe investmentequation in this paperbegins with
the lagged dependent variable. Just as we are interested in "inflation
inertia," we are interested in "investment inertia." The serial corre-
lation properties ofthe investment process, which result at least in part
from aggregation overheterogeneousprojectshavingdifferentgestation
lags, are part ofthe basic "propagation mechanism" by which random
shocks in the demand for investmentgoods are translated into business
cycles displaying persistence in the deviation of output from trend.
Most previous econometric work on investment, whether based on a
neoclassical specification like equation (3) or a Q specification like (9),
hasomittedthelaggeddependentvariable. Ifthe "true" investmentpro-
cess exhibits a high degree ofpositive serial correlation, then estimated
coefficients are likely to be biased when the lagged dependent variable
is omitted. Although we exhibit evidence ofthe effects ofthis misspe-
cification below, the nature ofthe bias canbe illustrated in thefollowing
simple model. Imagine that the true model ofinvestment spending (It)
involvesbothanacceleratoreffectonthelaggedchangeinoutput(ilXt - I )
and dependence on the lagged dependent variable (It - 1):
(10) It = ~dXt-I + pIt-I + et,
while the misspecified regression that is actually estimated is:
(11)
By the usual analysis of specification error in the case of a left-out
variable, we can write the expectation of the estimated accelerator
coefficient as:
(12) £(b) = ~ + ~p"
14. An assessment ofthe 1981-83 "disinflation experiment" using the DRI model and
a reduced-form approach is presented in papers by Eckstein (1983) and Gordon (1983a,
1984b). A detailed quantitative review ofthe performance ofmy equation in postsample
dynamic simulations is provided by Perry (1983).
15. See Gordon (1977) and Sims's comments in the printed discussion of that paper.286 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
where "I is the coefficient of the "auxiliary" regression of lagged in-
vestment on the lagged change in output. Since investment is part of
output, there is a presumption that "I is positive, although a precise
expression for "I requires a more complete specification of the time
series process generating noninvestment output. A full analysis ofthis
problem would also need to take accountofthefact that most empirical
accelerator equations include a set of current and several lagged ax
terms. It is sufficient here to note simply that tests of the accelerator
hypothesis may yield biased coefficients, as in (12), and that the error
term in (11) is quite likely to exhibit serial correlation, since it is related
to the "true" error term etas follows:
(13) Ut = et + p[(1 - "I)]t-l + "Y]t-2 - "YdNt-l],
where N is noninvestment output.
The list of regressors for our investment equations, in addition to
the lagged dependent variable, begins with the two central variables in
the neoclassical approach, the change in output and in the real price
ofcapital services (C/P). Tobin's Qis included as well, in combination
with the neoclassical variables rather than alone as in equation (9).
Because changes in the money stock may be relevant for the formation
ofexpectations and/oras a proxyfor the effectofcreditrationing, these
are included as well. The most important variables that are omitted are
the prices of other inputs besides capital, for example, the real wage
and real energy prices. This omission is justified by the need to control
the scale ofthis empirical investigation, which tends to grow with the
square of the explanatory variables considered as candidates.
The empirical equations share with the VAR approach the use of
unconstrained and relatively short lag distributions and the inclusion
of the same number of lags for each explanatory variable, including
the lagged dependent variable. In ourinitial research, as in much other
recent VAR research, lag distributions were limited to four quarters.
Laterweadjustedthe lag lengthtoeightquartersforthe postwarperiod,
in light of the evidence that the coefficient on the price of capital
servicesfor the postwarperiodis sensitiveto anextensionoflag length.
Contemporaneous values ofvariables are excluded from the estimated
regressions. Subsequently we examine correlations among contem-
poraneous orthogonalizedinnovations in a VAR model containingequa-
tions for investment and for each of our final set of explanatory vari-
ables. At that stage we carry out several "innovation accounting"
exercises for two alternative choices of the ordering of contempora-
neous errors in the VAR system. As shown by Gordon and King (1982,
212-14), such choices amount to decisions about admitting current
variables into the estimating equations.
The specification of the investment equations in this paper differs
from most applications ofthe VAR technique in its correction for het-287 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
eroskedasticity and in its attention to the form of variables. All real
expenditure series are normalized by "natural real GNP" (XN). The
money supply is expressed in real terms, since it is entered into an
equation for real investment expenditures, and it is also normalized by
XN. Our empirical tests also examine shifts in coefficients over time.
The precise values ofthe individual lag coefficients are ofno particular
interest. Instead, we emphasize exclusion tests on the contribution of
all lags ofa given right-hand variable, running these tests for both the
interwarand the postwarperiods. This technique allows us to determine
whether the relative contribution of different sets of variables has
changed over time. There is no analogy in the paperto the usual search
for significant coefficients, since positive and negative results in the
exclusion tests are equally interesting.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 Development of the Basic Variables
This paper investigates the historical behavior offour categories of
fixed investment: producers' durable equipment (PDE), nonresidential
structures (NRS), residential structures (RS), and consumer durables
expenditures (CD). Whereas in the previous literature some of these
categories have been analyzed with different theories in separate pa-
pers, here they all seem amenable to analysis within the same reduced-
form methodology. Our inclusion of consumer durables expenditures
as part of "investment" creates an overlap in coverage with Hall's
paper in this volume (chap. 4).
Quarterly data on the four investment categories for 1947-83 come
from the national income and product accounts. Investment and real
GNP data for 1919-41 are created by the Chow and Lin (1971) method
ofinterpolation from a variety ofsources, as described in the appendix
to this chapter. We have been careful to interpolate each component
ofreal GNP on the basis of separate data sources, in order to avoid a
spurious correlation between dependent and explanatory variables in
this study. The Chow/Lin method is an iterative procedure in which a
regression is run to explain a data series available only annually (e.g.,
real GNP), using as explanatory variables the annual average of one
or more series available monthly (e.g., industrial production and real
retail sales). In this example the coefficients from the regression are
used to create monthly (or in our case quarterly) values for real GNP.
Some investigators have carried out historical studies with raw monthly
dataratherthan interpolated data. Examples include Bernanke (1983b),
Sims (1980b), and the papers in this volume by Bernanke and Powell
(chap. 10) and Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (chap. 3). This makes sense288 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
when comparable monthly data are available for both the interwar and
the postwar periods. However, investigators of postwar investment
behavior have uniformly used national accounts quarterly data, not
monthly data on the industrial production ofproducer durables and on
square feet ofnonresidential construction. To achieve comparability in
a study of investment, interpolated quarterly data for the interwar
period are preferable. Further, to use the raw monthly data would
involve discarding the information available in the annual averages for
components of real GNP. It seems clear from the literature that the
previous absence ofquarterly investment expenditure data for the in-
terwar period has caused investigators to limit themselves to the post-
war period, and we hope that the availability of the new data set will
spur further historical research on investment and other components
of real GNP.
All expenditure series, real GNP, the real capital stock, and the real
money supply are deflated by the "natural real GNP" (XN) series,
whose the creation is described in Gordon (1984a, appendix C). The
basic procedure is to establish a constant "natural rate of unemploy-
ment" for the portion ofthe labor force not engaged as self-employed
farmers and proprietors-this natural rate is arbitrarily set equal to the
rate estimated for 1954 in a study of inflation dynamics covering the
period 1954-80. Then, adjusting for the shrinking share ofself-employed
proprietors (who are not counted among the unemployed), the corre-
sponding total natural unemployment rate series is used to establish
the level of XN in selected benchmark years (1901, 1912, 1923, 1929,
1949, and 1954). Since actual and natural unemployment are not equal
in the benchmark years, an assumed "Okun's law" coefficient of 2.0
was used in calculating XN for those years, and the values for inter-
vening years were interpolated using logarithms. The deflation by XN
is introduced to avoid heteroskedasticity-the level of XN rises from
$229 billion in 1919 to $1,667 billion in 1983. Use of the XN series is
superior to detrending in a study of business cycles, since detrending
for a period like 1929-41 yields an unrealistically low estimate of"nor-
mal" conditions.
In addition to data on investment expenditures, this study has de-
veloped five otherseries as possible explanatory variables. All are from
original sources, and only the capital stock is interpolated. The others
are available monthly.
1. Capital stock. This is available as an annual series from the Com-
merce Department capital stock study for both producers' durable
equipment and nonresidential structures. Four concepts are available,
gross and net, in current and constant dollars. In this study the net
real stock is interpolated quarterly (as described in the appendix). It
is used and subsequently rejected as an explanatory variable, and the289 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
net real stock times the current investment price deflator is used as an
estimate of the replacement cost ofcapital for construction ofthe "Q
proxy" described below.
2. Real money supply and real monetary base. The "high powered
money" series is from Friedman and Schwartz (1970), divided by the
interpolated GNP deflator and linked to the corresponding postwar
series. The M1 series has been created by Benjamin Friedman back to
1915 on a basis that is consistent with the current (early 1980s) definition.
3. "Average Q." First a "Q proxy" series is calculated as an index
number, with 1972:2 = 1.0, since the numerator and denominator are
in different units. The numerator is the Standard and Poor's 500 stock
price index, and the denominator is the replacement-cost net capital
stockindex describedabove. This quarterly series is used to interpolate
Summers's annual average "conventional Q" series (1981, table 3, col.
1) for the period 1931-79. Data for 1919-30 and 1980-83 are obtained
by linking "Q proxy" to the interpolated Summers series in 1931 and
1980.
4. Real interest rate. The expected inflation rate used to calculate
the real interest rate is typically computed as the predicted value from
a simple time series regression including lagged inflation and a few
other lagged variables. Invariably this leads to a predicted series in
which the main weight is carried by the first lag on inflation, and the
result is a highly volatile estimate ofthe expected inflation rate and the
corresponding expected real interest rate relevant for investment de-
cisions. In this study the volatil~ series produced by this procedure is
ignored, and in its place we use a twelve-quarter "rectangular" weighted
average of past inflation. Even this arbitrary approximation is flawed,
however, because it gives unreasonable values in periods for the first
few years after both World War I and World War II. As Gordon has
argued previously (1973), rational agents would have treated wars and
immediate postwarperiods as special episodes, in light ofa long history
of wartime inflation and postwar deflation. Since there was no trend
in prices over the century before World War I, an expected inflation
rate ofzero is imposed for the interval 1919-24, and the twelve-quarter
average is introduced beginning in 1925:1. After World War II the same
procedure is used for 1947-49, except that the constant value is set
equal to 2.6%, the value of the twelve-quarter average in 1950: 1. This
series on expected inflation is subtracted from the Baa rate, to reflect
the presumed relevance of a less than highest grade interest rate for
the average investment decision.
5. The realprice ofcapital services (C/P). Standard formulas, shown
in the appendix, are used to calculate the real price ofcapital services
from a variety of data sources. The before-tax real borrowing rate is
taken to be the real Baa rate, from series 4 above. This facilitates290 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
comparisons of the effects of the full C/P variable as contrasted with
that of the real Baa rate, one of the major components of C/P. The
depreciation rate included in the estimate ofC/P is that which is yielded
by an iterative search for the rate that makes the quarterly interpolated
capital stock series in (1) above consistent with the published annual
capital stock series and our new interpolated quarterly investment se-
ries. Tax rates are obtained from published sources, as described in
the appendix.
5.3.2 Fixed Investment in Recessions, 1920-82
Descriptive statistics on the variables used in this paperare provided
in tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. The first ofthese calculates the percentage
decline in three ratios to XN over the thirteen recessions in our sample
period, five in the interwar period and eight in the postwar period.
NBER reference cycles are used throughout, and this creates an in-
consistency between the cycle dating procedure actually used (see the
chronology paper by Moore and Zarnowitz in this volume, appendix
A) and the "growth cycle" concept that would be more relevant given
our deflation of real variables by XN.
Column 1 of table 5.1 shows the percentage decline in the "output
ratio" X/XN, ranging from 40.2% in 1929-33 to only 2.7% in 1960-61.
The next three columns exhibit recession declines in the ratio ofthree
different investment magnitudes to XN-all four types ofexpenditure,
the two "business" types (PDE + NRS), and the two "household"
types (RS + CD), respectively. Leaving aside the mammoth numbers
for 1929-33, the largest absolute declines in total investment were in
the recessions of 1920-21, 1937-38, and 1973-75, in that order.
The remaining columns oftable 5.1 establish the importance offixed
investment behavior as a contributing factor in business cycles. Shown
for each cycle is the percentage of the total decline in the X/XN ratio
accounted for by the decline in the ratio of total investment to XN.
While these percentages are quite small for the first two postwarreces-
sions, in other recessions they range from 30% to 78%, with the reces-
sions in which investment played the largest role ranked as 1920-21,
1960-61, and 1980. Interestingly, the relative contribution of invest-
ment to the Great Contraction of 1929-33 was less than in all five of
the postwar recessions between 1957-58 and 1980. There seems to be
no systematic difference between the interwar and postwar recessions
in the division of the investment decline betweeen the two business
types and the two household types. The two business types accounted
for a larger contribution in eight ofthe thirteen recessions, and the two
household types did so in the remainder.
The three right-hand columns display anelasticityconcept, measured
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divided by the average value ofeach ratio in the peak quarter ofeach
cycle. An elasticity of unity would indicate that the decline in invest-
ment was proportional to its peak-quarter share, that is, that the per-
centage responses of investment and noninvestment were equal. An
elasticity above unity indicates that the contribution of investment to
the decline in real GNP was larger than its peak-quarter share in real
GNP, and that the contribution ofnoninvestment must have been smaller.
For all four types ofinvestment (col. 8), the elasticities range from 0.6
to 3.7. The elasticity for the Great Contraction is a middle-ranked 1.8,
less than in the 1920-21, 1923-24, and 1937-38 interwar recessions
and in all five of the recessions between 1957-58 and 1980. At least
one example with a low elasticity can be easily explained, the 1953-
54 recession in which the dominant depressing influence on real GNP
was the post-Korea decline in defense spending. And the relatively
high elasticity ofhousehold investmentin 1980 may reflect the influence
ofthe Carter credit controls.
5.3.3 Means and Standard Deviations
Table 5.2 displays means and standard deviations of the variables
used in this paper over thirteen complete trough-to-trough business
cycles between 1919 and 1982 and one incomplete cycle between 1938
and 1941. Also shown are averages for the entire interwar period and
postwarperiod. Eachcell shows the mean, withthe associated standard
deviationdisplayedimmediately below inparentheses. Thefirst column
shows that on average the X/XN ratio was considerably higher in the
postwar period than the interwar period, and of this 10.3 percentage
point difference, 5.2 points are accounted for by the four investment
types taken together. Also evident is the much higher standard devia-
tion ofthe X/XN and the total real investment series during the interwar
period over individual cycles. The regression equations in the subse-
quent tables ofresults cover several business cycles in each subsample
period, and this implies that regression coefficients depend notjust on
the quarter-to-quarter variance of the investment series, but also on
changes in means across cycles.
In this light it is interesting to note the high means for both types of
structures investment that reflect the construction boom ofthe 1920s,
which plays a large role in some nonmonetary explanations ofthe Great
Depresson (see Gordon and Wilcox 1981) and in our analysis below in
section 5.5. The ratios to XN of nonresidential structures were higher
in the 1921, 1924, and 1927 cycles than in any postwarcycle. The mean
for the 1924 cycle was highest for residential construction, followed
by 1949 and a tie between 1921 and 1954. The ratios to XN ofproducers'
durable equipment and consumer durables show quite a different pat-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.295 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Another difference between the two structures types and the two
equipment types concerns the difference between the interwar and
postwar standard deviations. The standard deviations ofnonresidential
and residential structures fell from 2.4 to 0.5 and 1.6 to 0.8 points,
respectively. The standard deviations of producer and consumer du-
rabIes fell much less, from 1.4 to 0.9 and 1.3 to 1.1, respectively. While
nonresidential structures had by far the highest standard deviation in
the interwar years, consumer durables had the highest standard devia-
tion in the postwar years.
Additional insight into the behavior of investment spending is pro-
vided by figures 5.1 and 5.2. The former displays real GNP (X), total
investment (I), and noninvestment GNP (N), each expressed as a ratio
to XN. Here we note the contrast between the volatility of I in the
1920-21 recession and subsequent recovery, and its relative stability
during 1923-29. Evident throughout the interwar period is the high
positive covariance between I and N; this covariance appears to occur
at annual and lower frequencies and is not an artifact of our interpo-
lation procedure. The postwar period is dominated by the large bulge
in N during the Korean War, though there is a less pronounced hump
in I in 1972-74. Also evident is the downward drift in both X and N
relative to I after 1966. The robust health ofthe IIXNratio in the second
half of the 1970s suggests the possibility that our average Q variable
may perform poorly, in light of its collapse after 1973.
Figure 5.2 exhibits each of the four categories of investment, also
expressed as a ratio to XN. The investment boom ofthe 1920s and the
unusual share of boom contributed by nonresidential structures are
clearly visible. The 1930s are characterized by a simultaneous collapse
in all four categories, as well as by a milder slump ofconsumerdurables
spending. By 1939-40, the two equipment categories had each re-
covered to within a percentage point of the 1926-29 average, but res-
idential structures had recovered only to about half of the 1926-29
level, and nonresidential structures to less than one-third. Postwar
business cycles exhibit a continuing shift from structures to equipment,
together with a general tendency for booms in residential structures to
lead booms in PDE, with consumer durables in between. Cycles in
nonresidential structures do not coincide with those in the other four
categories, with the appearance of a process involving much longer
lags.
Table 5.2 exhibits the means and standard deviations of the major
explanatory variables-the real money stock expressed as a ratio to
XN, the price ofcapital services, average Q, and the real Baa rate. The
behavior of these variables is illustrated in figure 5.3, where each is
expressed as an index with 1919:1 = 1.0. The most stable variable in





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.299 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
which consists of a slight uptrend at the end of the 1930s and a con-
sistent downtrend during the postwar period. The standard deviation
ofreal M1 is smaller than that oftotal investment within most interwar
cycles and is about the same orderofmagnitude during postwarcycles.
The capital service price has a small standard deviation and little
drift. It exhibits two major humps, in response to high real interest
rates in 1930-34 and 1980-83. The smaller degree of volatility in the
capital service price than in the real interest rate reflects the dominant
role in the former variable ofa fixed depreciation rate. Both the service
price and the real interest rate exhibit minima in 1936-37, 1952-53,
and 1975-77, reflecting price increases that are subtracted from the
nominal Baa rate. The average Q variable (expressed as a percentage
in table 5.2) has a much higher mean in the interwar period than in the
postwar. The standard deviation ofQ averaged overthe interwarperiod
was double that in the postwar, and the average for individual cycles
in the interwarperiod was more than four times higher than the average
for individual postwar cycles.
The regression analysis in the next part of the paper compares the
differing relative contributions of lagged investment and lagged GNP
in explaining current investment. As a preliminary, we present a de-
composition of variance of the ratios to ){N of real GNP (X), real
investment (I), and real noninvestment GNP (N). A familiar formula
linking the variances of these three variables is:
(14) var(X) = var(/) + var(N) + 2cov(/,N).
The top half of table 5.3 presents a decomposition of variance as in
(12) for the interwar and postwar periods, and for the two halves of
the postwar. The bottom half of the table exhibits a parallel decom-
position for the four components of total investment.
The enormous decline in the variance ofall components in the post-
war period is immediately apparent. There is no decline, however, in
the ratio var(/)/var(X), which is slightly higher in 1947-65 and 1947-
83 than in 1919-41. The most interesting contrast between the interwar
and postwar periods is in the covariance term. The positive covariance
between I and N contributes almost half of the total variance of real
GNP in 1919-41, whereas it contributes a negligible fraction in 1947-
65 and is actually negative in the postwar period taken as a whole. One
may conjecture that whereas the interwar period was dominated by
the cyclical behavior of private spending, much of the variance of
noninvestment in the postwar period was contributed by government
spending. The negative covariance of 1 and N in the postwar period
may suggest that investment was "crowded out" by major increases
in government spending.
The bottom halfofthe table shows that about two-thirds ofthe total
variance of investment in the interwar period was contributed by the300 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
Table 5.3 Decomposition of Variance: Real GNP, Investment, and
Noninvestment, Percentage Ratios to Natural Real GNP
1919:1 1947:1 1966:1 1947:1
to 1941:3 to 1965:4 to 1983:4 to 1983:4
Total real GNP
Variance (X) 157.4 7.3 15.8 12.0
Variance(l) 38.9 2.0 2.2 3.2
Variance(N) 45.7 4.9 10.6 11.2
2 covariance (I, N) 72.8 0.4 3.0 -2.4
Variance (l)/variance (X) 0.25 0.27 0.14 0.27
Variance (N)/variance (X) 0.29 0.67 0.67 0.93
Four types ofinvestment
Variance(l) 38.9 2.0 2.2 3.2
Variance (PDE) 2.0 0.4 0.3 0.9
Variance (RS) 2.7 0.3 0.6 0.6
Variance (NRS) 5.7 0.1 0.3 0.2
Variance (CD) 1.6 0.4 0.4 1.4
Residual
covariance terms 26.9 0.8 0.6 0.1
covariance term, thatis, a shock commonto all investmenttypes rather
than to only one. Inthe two halves ofthe postwarperiod the covariance
terms contribute less than half, and they contribute virtually nothing
for the postwar period taken as a whole. The largest "own variance"
in the full postwar period is for consumer durables, but the smaller
value of this term for the two separate halves of the postwar period
indicates the dominance of a trend effect. Nonresidential structures
shiftedfrom contributingthe largestownvariance intheinterwarperiod
to the smallest in the postwar period.
5.4 Regression Equations Explaining Total Investment Expenditures
5.4.1 Will the Real Accelerator Please Stand Up?
The starting point of our hybrid methodology is to determine the
specification for a reduced-form investment equation that seems "rea-
sonable" a priori. Our goal is then to use the estimated reduced-form
equations to suggest "data coherent" ways of moving to more struc-
tural models and interpretations. In arriving at such interpretations,
we recognize the conventional wisdom that many structural models
may imply the same reduced form. However, there is a similar problem
with structuralmodels. Quite dissimilar "structural" models may result
when the same general economic phenomenon is interpreted by dif-
ferent authors.301 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Forexample, a starting pointin many studies ofinvestment behavior,
and an ending point in some, is the accelerator hypothesis. In its sim-
plest form, dating back to Clark (1917), it explains the level of real
investment as a function ofthe change in real GNP. But this apparently
straightforward idea does not imply a single "structural" specification.
The change in real GNP may enter only as a current value or as a
combination of current and lagged values. Or the investigation may
start from the "flexible accelerator" hypothesis, in which investment
depends on the current level of output and one lagged value of the
capital stock. Orone might adopta moregeneraldynamic specification,
as in table 5.4 below, that allows several lagged values of investment
to enter as well as current and lagged changes in output. Since the
coefficient on lagged investment turns out to be roughly unity, this last
alternative amounts toa regression explainingthechange ofinvestment
spending, in which case the accelerator hypothesis would call for the
output variable to enteras a seconddifference. A rational expectations
approach to the accelerator, as in Abel and Blanchard (1983), would
imply a reduced form in which levels ofexpectedfuture output appear,
ratherthanlagged values. Theseexpectationsmaybefunctions ofmany
variables in addition to lagged output. An extreme version of the ex-
pectational approach to investment behavior might lead to the conclu-
sion that investment is a random walk, parallel to Hall's (1978) inter-
pretation of consumption as a random walk.
All these models are merely alternative formulations ofa single un-
derlying structure, the accelerator mechanism. However, each model
results in a different specification for the appropriate reduced-form
equation. This proliferation ofstructural models is also a problem with
the other mechanisms that are claimed to be important for explaining
investment, for example, the Q approach. To avoid losing sight ofour
objectives by examining a multitude ofdifferent formulations, we choose
to set up "straw man" reduced forms that are relatively unrestricted
and allow alternative explanatory variables suggested by alternative
theories to enter on equal terms.
5.4.2 Contribution of the Accelerator and the Cost of Capital
We begin by examining reduced-form regressions for eachofthefour
individual categories oftotal investment: consumer durables, residen-
tial structures, producers' durable equipment, and nonresidential struc-
tures. We begin at a disaggregated level and subsequently study the
consequences ofalternative aggregation schemes. In table 5.4 and later
tables, the full sample period ofavailable quarterly data is divided into
1919-41 and 1947-83. In preliminary work a break was allowed in the
middle of the postwar period at 1965, but Chow tests rejected the
hypothesis of a structural change for most equations, and so here the302 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
postwar period is treated as a single entity. There are insufficient de-
grees of freedom available to test for a structural break within the
interwar period at 1929. Chow tests indicate a decisive break in struc-
ture at World War 11. 16
Our reduced-form equations omit the lagged capital stock (Kt - 1) term,
which appears in (3), for two reasons. First, an identity links the lagged
capital stockand lagged investment, precluding an investmentequation
containing several lagged values ofinvestmentfrom also including sev-
erallagged values ofthe capital stock. Second, although a single lagged
value of the capital stock may appear, preliminary tests indicated sta-
tistical insignificance in every sample period.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are each arranged in two sections, corresponding
to the two sample periods (interwar and postwar). Each cell in the
tables contains results for each of the four categories of investment
spending in the following format: the first line ofeach section gives the
sum of coefficients with its significance level, and the second line ex-
hibits the significance level for an F-test on the exclusion ofall lags of
that explanatory variable. A blank on the second line indicates that the
.10 level of statistical significance was not attained.
The first line for each investment type in tables 5.4 and 5.5 presents
the regression results for what might be termed a "naive acceleratorl
cost ofcapital" specification ofthe investment equation. The log level
of investment spending (IIXN) is regressed on eight lagged first differ-
ences of real noninvestment GNP, Ii.NIXN, and eight lagged values of
first differences ofthe appropriate real cost ofcapital series (Ii.CIP). In
the regressions involving household investment in table 5.5, real per-
sonal disposable income, Ii.YDIXN, replaces real GNP, and eight lags of
the first difference ofthe real Baa interest rate are used as a proxy for
the price of investment. In line 1 both the R2 and Durbin-Watson sta-
tistic are very low for all categories over all periods, indicating a poor
fit and serially correlated errors. The "accelerator" variable passes the
exclusion test only for producers' durable equipment in the interwar
period and for residential structures in the postwar. An even poorer
showing is exhibited by the "cost ofcapital," which passes the exclu-
sion test only for postwar residential structures.
Line 2 in each block is identical to line 1, except that four lags of
the dependent variable are included as additional regressors. The re-
sults from these regressions further weaken the casefor the accelerator
and the price of investment. For all categories and all sample periods
the lagged dependent variables terms entersignificantly atthe .01 level.
16. Recall thatquantitativecontrols during World WarII preclude a meaningful analysis
ofinvestment behavior during that period. Further, some ofthe series used for our data
interpolation are not available after 1941; thus our data series have not been created for
the 1942-46 interval.303 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Both the accelerator and the price ofinvestment become insignificant
for most types and sample periods. While the accelerator variable has
explanatory power for postwar producer durables, and for consumer
durables in both periods, the sums ofthe coefficients are insignificantly
different from zero in every equation. Overall this formulation of the
two traditionally dominant explanations of investment behavior fares
poorly in both the interwar and the postwar periods.
5.4.3 Contribution ofQand Real Ml
Since the sum of coefficients on lagged investment in line 2 ofeach
block is close to unity, the equation amounts to an explanation of the
behavior ofthe first difference ofinvestment. To be consistent with the
first difference format, in line 3 the accelerator is expressed as the first
difference ofthe first difference ofreal noninvestment GNP, aaNIXN,
and the remaining explanatory variables are entered as lagged values
of their first differences. Noninvestment GNP and the cost of capital
or interest rate terms enter with eight lags, while the remaining ex-
planatory variables enter with four lags. Our measure for Tobin's av-
erage Q has no significant explanatory power, except for postwar non-
residential structures, and as often as not enters with the wrong sign.
The change in CIP continues to be insignificant in the exclusion tests,
although the sum of coefficients is significantly negative for the two
durables categories in the postwar period.
Previous research by King (1983) and Sims (1983) has emphasized
a distinction between the role ofinside and outside money as a deter-
minant of real output. In the work of King this distinction is imple-
mented by entering the two multiplicative components of Ml, the
money multiplier and monetary base (MIIP = m(BIP)), separately in
VAR models for total output. We can investigate the same issue here
and inquire whether the effect of monetary changes on investment
occurs through the multiplier, the base, or a mixture of the two. The
first difference specification for the explanatory variables suggests
that we should split the change in Ml into the level of the multiplier
times the first difference in the base (mMJIP), and the level of the
base times the first difference in the multiplier (BIPam). Both com-
ponents enter significantly into the equations for producer and con-
sumer durables, interwar and postwar. The change in the money mul-
tiplier has moderate explanatory power for both structures categories
in the postwar period, as well as for nonresidential structures in the
interwar period.
5.4.4 Other Specifications
The final reduced-form specification appears in line 3 or 4 of each





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.308 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
excluding variables that are significant but have the wrong signs. Both
the accelerator and the price of investment are included along with
average Qand the monetary variables. The accelerator variable is sig-
nificant only for postwar producers' durable equipment. We experi-
mented with alternative specifications ofthe final reducedform in order
to check the robustness ofour results. In these tests the cost ofcapital
term in the business investment equations was replaced by the real Baa
rate, but this rate was never significant and as often as not carried the
wrong sign.
A variant ofthe "expectational accelerator" was also estimated by
a two-stage procedure. Time series models for noninvestment GNP
and personal disposable income were estimated and used to generate
k-step ahead forecasts. Eight leads ofthese forecasts, in various trans-
formations, were used as explanatory variables but were always insig-
nificant, often with the wrong sign, for all but postwar producers'
durable equipment. This set ofresults implies that the significant mon-
etary variables in tables 5.4 and 5.5 enterdirectly into the determination
of investment spending, rather than indirectly through an effect on
expectations offuture output.
5.4.5 Summary of Disaggregated Results
Perhaps the most surprising result of these initial reduced-form es-
timates is the small explanatory role accorded conventional variables
and the large role given to unconventional variables like the real
money supply. The poor showing of the interest rate and cost of
capital, combined with the singular importance of average Qfor non-
residential structures, leads one to suspect that the financing decision
is an important determinant of investment expenditures. The broad
role played by the money multiplier may indicate that credit rationing,
rather than interest rate changes, is the primary constraint in the
financing decision. This view is consistent with that expressed in
Roosa (1951) as to the dominant channel through which monetary
policy affects the economy.
The similarities in the behavior of the two structures and the two
durable goods categories suggest that aggregation by asset type rather
than by decision maker is preferable. This approach to disaggregation
would also be in accord with Tobin's asset approach, insofaras durable
goods are normally shorter lived than structures. However, this ap-
proach is at odds with the conventional structural approach to invest-
ment. With its focus on the investment decision, the traditional ap-
proach has always aggregated by decision maker (i.e., household vs.
business) rather than by character of the asset (i.e., structures vs.
equipment).309 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
5.4.6 Aggregation Schemes
Table 5.6 displays our basic equation for two alternative aggregation
schemes, householdlbusiness and durables/structures. The household/
business aggregation scheme is not particularly successful. In the in-
terwar period both categories appear to be autonomous, with only
lagged "own values" passing the exclusion test (as well as the money
multiplier in the business equation). Both real monetary variables be-
come highly significant for the two categories in the postwar period.
The only difference in behavior between household and business in-
vestment appears in the postwar period, when business investment
exhibits a strong accelerator effect. If we were to ignore real balance
effects, as does most of the literature, then aggregation by decision
maker would result in a pair of highly autonomous investment series
in the interwar period. Stated another way, this aggregation scheme
would indicate that the decision maker does not respond to relevant
economic variables.
Aggregation by the asset character of investment leads to more il-
luminating results. Durable equipment and structures exhibit marked
differences in behavior in both sample periods. Structures investment
for 1919-41 is quite autonomous, but durables expenditures exhibit
sensitivity to interest rates (with the wrong sign) and to real monetary
variables. More important is the finding that real money balances are
highly significant in explaining both investment categories in the post-
war period. Durable goods are sensitive to the accelerator and interest
rates (with the correct sign), whereas structures depend significantly
on the average Q variable. This result may indicate the importance of
the different financing methods that are used for equipment and struc-
tures. One might think ofshort-lived assets as financed to a large extent
by internally generated funds, that is, retained earnings and disposable
income, while investment in structures may depend heavily on con-
ditions in the bond and security markets.
Using the alternative aggregation criterion of asset durability pro-
duces the most sensible results in table 5.6. Investment behavior is
found to differ between short- and long-lived assets in a way that is
statistically significant. The accelerator and the Baa rate are both im-
portant for investment in durables, while structures (dominated by the
nonresidential category) respond to average Q. These results provide
evidence supporting the importance offinancial conditions for invest-
ment decisions. What is surprising is the way the conventional in-
vestment literature, with its emphasis on the business investment de-
cision, has overemphasized disaggregation by decision maker and has
glossed over the importance ofthe asset characteristics ofinvestment



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.311 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
5.5 Investment in a Vector Autoregression Model
5.5.1 Correlations among Contemporaneous Innovations
The equations estimated in tables 5.4 to 5.6 investigate the feedback
from the various lagged explanatory variables to components of in-
vestment, but they say nothing about the relationships among contem-
poraneous innovations in the variables, or about the feedback from
investment to the explanatory variables. These issues can be addressed
by analyzing a vector autoregression (VAR) system that contains the
primary variables of interest. We economize on space by restricting
attention to a VAR model containing six variables-real investment in
structures (ISTR), real investment in durable goods (IDG), real non-
investment GNP (N), the real money base (BIP), the Ml money mul-
tiplier (m), and the real Baa interest rate (r). For the interwar period
the interest rate variable in table 5.6 has the incorrect (positive) sign
in the equations for both ISTR and IDG, leading us to choose a five-
variable system omitting the interest rate for 1920-41.
All variables (except m and r) are once again expressed as ratios to
natural real GNP (XN). To maintain the symmetry required for the VAR
system, all variables are expressed as first differences, in contrast to
tables 5.4 to 5.6, where investment is expressed as a ratio, output as
a second difference, and the other variables as first differences. Extra
degrees offreedom allow the inclusion ofeight lags on all variables in
the postwar period, as opposed to four lags in the interwar period.
Columns in table 5.7 correspond to each of the six variables in the
VAR system. A slash (I) divides the interwar result from the postwar
result in both the top and bottom sections of the table. The dashes
(-) indicate the exclusion of the interest rate in the interwar model.
The top section shows correlations among contemporaneous innova-
tions. There is a uniformly high correlation between the two compo-
nents of investment, ISTR and IDG. Another similarity between the
interwar and postwar periods is the positive correlation between the
money multiplier (m) and both ISTR and IDG, the negative correlation
between IDG and the monetary base (BIP), and the high negative cor-
relation between the base and the multiplier. Perhaps the most impor-
tant difference between the interwar and postwar periods is the sharp
decline in the correlation ofdurable goods investment (IDG) with non-
investment GNP (N). This is similar to the decomposition ofvariance
in table 5.3 above and may indicate that N in the interwar period is
dominated by a common impulse to private spending that also influ-
enced IDG, whereas in the postwar period N was more affected by
defense expenditures in the Korea and Vietnam periods that had no
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.313 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
The correlations of the base and the multiplier with noninvestment
GNPchange signs in the postwarperiod. This is suggestive ofa change
in the behavior of monetary policy between the two periods. Another
"structural" shift is suggested by the change of the coefficient of the
interest rate on IDG from positive (shown in table 5.6 but not table
5.7) to negative. This should be interpreted in conjunction with the
sharp decline in the correlation of Nand IDG in the postwar period.
These facts may indicate that durable goods expenditures in the inter-
war tended to be more constrained by income or retained earnings,
whereas in the postwar period the availability and price ofcredit was
relatively more important.
5.5.2 Multivariate Exogeneity Tests
The bottom section of table 5.7 displays significance levels for the
contribution of each explanatory variable in each equation. Explana-
tory variables are represented by the six columns, and dependent vari-
ables by the six lines. Asterisks denote the same significance levels as
in tables 5.4 to 5.6 and are calculated from F-ratios on the joint exclu-
sion ofall lags ofa particular variable. Often such tables reveal a highly
significant set ofdiagonal elements, reflecting highly significant lagged
dependent variables in the VAR equations. This occurs here only for
IDG, HIP, and m. The insignificance of the other diagonal elements
may reflect the fact that all variables in the model are expressed as
first differences.
Investment in structures appears to be relatively exogenous in both
periods, with modest feedback from noninvestment GNP in the inter-
warand the money multiplierin the postwar. Durablegoods investment
exhibits substantial feedback from several variables in either period or
both, and in this sense is much less "autonomous" than investment in
structures. The pattern of monetary influences on IDG and N differs.
While IDG reflects significantfeedback from the base and the multiplier
in both periods, N reflects feedback from the base in both periods, the
interest rate in the postwar period, and the multiplier in neither. A
notable feature ofthe pattern ofexogeneity is the independence ofthe
money multiplier and the interest rate from almost all the other vari-
ables. In the postwar period the interest rate is totally independent of
all the remaining variables, feeding into only IDG and N. The channel
ofinfluence from the interest rate to investment, ifany, appears to be
indirect, running through noninvestment GNP, with only a weak direct
effect in the postwar period. The pattern of these exogeneity results
may suggest the existence oftwo impulse sources in the business cycle,
one financial (interest rates and money multiplier) and the other real
(investment in structures), whose effects interact through the propa-
gation mechanism represented here by the remaining variables.314 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
5.5.3 Innovation Accounting
VAR modeling techniques are often criticized for the ambiguity in-
herent in the a priori ordering of the variables necessary to carry out
the usual "innovation accounting" exercise. However, the allocation
of the variance of the investment categories between "own" innova-
tions and innovations in other explanatory variables is of interest in
any investigation ofthe role played by investment in business cycles.
As with our choice of aggregation schemes, we allow our earlier em-
pirical results to suggest "appropriate" orderings ofthe variables. The
equations estimated in table 5.6 suggest that investment in structures
is quite autonomous, a result reinforced by the exogeneity tests oftable
5.7. Our basic model, as it appears in the top half of table 5.8, places
structures (ISTR) first in the ordering, followed by investment in du-
rabIes (IDG). Gestation lags in both types ofinvestment make it plau-
sible that at least one quarter is required before investment spending
can be influenced by changes in noninvestment real GNP (N), the real
base (BIP), the multiplier (m), or interest rate (r). Although our em-
pirical results cast doubt on other ordering schemes, a priori notions
about the importance ofautonomous government spending in the post-
war period might suggest an ordering with noninvestment real GNP
first, followed by investment in structures, then durables. Results for
this ordering appear in the bottom half of table 5.8. The interest rate
Table 5.8 Innovation Accounting at Sixteen-Quarter Forecast Horizon in
Two VAR Models (Interwar/Postwar)
Dependent MSTR MDG aN MJ/P am ar
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSTR 76.8/58.0 4.41 4.2 7.71 5.6 3.31 2.8 7.8122.5 -/7.0
MDG 13.2/15.8 44.4/45.4 10.01 8.1 8.31 5.2 24.1111.7 -/13.7
aN 7.8/10.0 20.9/ 3.3 47.6/56.6 10.5/ 6.7 13.2/10.4 -/13.0
MJIP 6.7/ 4.8 4.91 7.3 11.71 7.1 63.0/68.6 13.7/ 8.3 -/3.9
am 13.21 7.4 8.61 5.4 13.51 6.5 24.7/20.5 40.0/49.4 -110.8
ar -110.3 -/7.1 -/2.2 -/7.4 -111.0 -/62.0
Dependent 1i.N MSTR MDG MJIP ti.m 1i.r
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
aN 64.8/57.5 7.7/ 9.1 3.81 3.3 10.51 6.7 13.2/10.4 -/13.0
MSTR 5.3/ 6.6 76.9/57.1 6.71 4.1 3.31 2.8 7.8122.5 -/7.0
MDG 19.61 8.8 13.7/15.0 34.3/45.5 8.31 5.2 24.1111.7 -/13.7
MJIP 13.51 7.8 7.01 4.1 2.81 7.4 63.0/68.6 13.71 8.3 -/3.9
am 16.11 6.5 13.81 7.4 5.41 5.4 24.7/20.5 40.0/49.4 -/10.8
ar -I 2.1 -/10.5 -/7.0 -111.0 -/7.4 -/62.0
Note: As in table 5.7, dashes indicate that the interest rate is excluded from the model
for the interwar period.315 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
is placed last in both orderings, since the theory of efficient markets
suggests an instantaneous response to innovations in other variables.
BIPand m are intermediate variables butare capable ofmoving quickly,
particularly if the Federal Reserve is operating to stabilize the interest
rate.
In the ordering with structures first, the own innovation ofstructures
accounts for most its variance at the sixteen-quarter forecast horizon
in both sample periods. This own contribution is not altered in the
slightest by placing N first in the ordering. Structures appear to be
virtually autonomous, with a highly significant influence only from the
money multiplier in the postwar period. ISTR acounts for more than
10% of the variance of IDG in both periods, Nand r in the postwar,
and m in the interwar. In an alternative version ofthe model in which
the variables are expressed in levels (not shown in table 5.8), the role
ofISTR is substantially greater, accounting for at least one-third ofthe
variance of almost all the other variables in both periods.
Innovations in IDG account for more ofthe variance ofN than vice
versa in the interwar period, which might be interpreted as indicating
that the multiplier was a stronger influence than the accelerator during
that interval. Investment in durables displays substantialfeedback both
from investment in structures and from the money multiplier in both
periods. That the money multiplier has a larger effect on the three
categories ofspending (ISTR, IDG, and N) than the two otherfinancial
variables (BIP and r) may indicate that the collapse of the banking
system in 1929-33 and disintermediation in the postwar period were
important channels of influence, proxied by the money multiplier, of
the financial system on real expenditures. As mentioned above, the
ordering in the bottom of table 5.8 that places N first does not change
these results significantly, and this seems to support our argument for
the exogeneity of investment in structures.
5.5.4 Historical DecompositionofVariance in BothInvestmentTypes
A more revealing display of the implications of the VAR model is
contained in the historical decomposition ofeach series in the system
over each ofthe sample periods. The ordering used in arriving at these
decompositions was that of our basic VAR model that places the ex-
planatory variables in the ordershown in the top halfoftable 5.8 (ISTR,
IDG, N, BIP, m, and r). To limit the number ofdiagrams, we present
only the decomposition ofthe two categories ofinvestment-interwar
structures in figure 5.4 and durable goods in figure 5.5, followed by
postwar structures in figure 5.6 and durable goods in figure 5.7.
The top frame in each diagram compares the actual time path of
investment with a "projection" that summarizes the net effect ofthe
constant terms in all of the equations. The contribution ofeach ofthe316 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
other variables in the system then appears below. These contributions
refer not just to the lagged values times the estimated coefficients in
the IDG equation alone, but rather to the contributions of the inno-
vations in each variable to investment behavior, taking account of all
channels of feedback working through the six-equation model (recall
that interest rates are excluded in the interwar period).
The predominant role of own innovations in the structures invest-
ment (ISTR) process is evident in figure 5.4. There is a high plateau in
the own innovations series in 1926-27, a gradual downward movement
in 1928-29, and a sharp plunge beginning in 1929:3, before the fourth-
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novation series remains negative throughout 1931-41, supporting the
interpretationof" overbuilding" in the 1920s that required a long period
of subsequent adjustment in the 1930s.
Two other variables display interesting patterns in figure 5.4. The
real monetary base (BIP) makes a major negative contribution in 1927-
31 and a positive contribution in 1938-41. The latter episode is easy
to understand in light of the large inflow of gold to the United States
during this period. However, the decline in the contribution in BIP in
1927-31 may seem puzzling, since nominal B varied little in the Great
Contraction of1929-33, while the price level (P) declined substantially.
The behavior of the BIP contribution can be explained in terms of the
"projection" for BIP(not shown), which displays a sharp upward trend
during the entire period 1920-41 in response to the doubling of BIP
between 1920 and 1941. The actual value of RIP is below this "pro-
jection" continuously from 1920 to 1938 and then above it from 1939
to 1941. Thus the VAR historical decomposition algorithm interprets
the slow increase in the real base in 1927-31 as being an actual decline
relative to trend, and this is reflected in the contribution of base in-
novations to structures investment in figure 5.4. The other variable
making an important contribution is the money multiplier, which ex-
hibits a sharp decline during the period of monetary contraction and
bank failures between 1931 and 1933, as well as after the increase in
reserve requirements in 1936-37. The role ofthe multiplier makes our
analysis compatible with the emphasis on the financial crisis in Ber-
nanke (1983b).
Figure 5.5 shows the interwar historical decomposition of innova-
tions to equipment investment. Compared with figure 5.4 for interwar
structures, the own innovations in IDG are relatively less important
and the innovations in the monetary base and money multiplier are
more important. To some extent the innovations in the base and mul-
tiplier are offsetting, and this reflects in part the upward trend of the
base and downward trend of the multiplier in the interwar period.
However, we recall from tables 5.4 to 5.6 that both the base and the
multiplier have consistently positive coefficients in the interwar regres-
sion equations for expenditures on durables.
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 decompose the variance of ISTR and IDG for
the postwar years. Note that in these figures the scale is compressed
horizontally and expanded vertically, since the ratio of investment to
natural output varied over so much smaller a range in the postwar
period. Figure 5.6for postwarstructures shares with the interwarfigure
5.4 a predominant role for own innovations. However, figure 5.7 for
durables is quite different from the other historical decompositions.
Structures innovations playa much more important role in explaining
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Fig. 5.5 Decomposition ofequipment, 1921-41.
durables. Further, there is a substantial role for real interest rate in-
novations in figure 5.7, supporting the highly significant negative coef-
ficients on the real interest rate variable in tables 5.4 to 5.6. The effect
of high real interest rates in 1981-83 in reducing investment expen-
ditures is particularly noticeable.
Thus any conclusion in this paper that investment contains a large
autonomous component must refer mainly to structures, whereas du-
rable equipment investment displays substantial feedback both from
structures investment and from financial variables. It does not seem
surprising that there should be feedback from structures investment to
equipment investment, since the two activities are complementary.
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Fig. 5.6 Decomposition of structures, 1949-83.
quires investment in equipment, just as residential construction stim-
ulates investment in furniture, appliances, and other components of
consumer durables expenditures.
5.5.5 The Temin "Autonomous Shift" in 1930
An important part of Temin's (1976) interpretation of the first stage
of the Great Contraction of 1929-33 is an autonomous shift in con-
sumption in 1930, which he identified by estimating an annual con-
sumption function. Our purpose here is not to review the controversy
stirred up by Temin's result (see Mayer 1980), but rather to reexamine
his hypothesis using the more definitive microscope provided by our
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Fig. 5.7 Decomposition ofequipment, 1949-83.
our interwar VAR models for the sixteen quarters covering 1929-32.
Asterisks are used to mark off residuals greater in size than 1.0 times
the standard error of estimate (see note to table 5.9).
The five variables of the model are the first differences of, respec-
tively, investment in structures (ISTR), investment in durables (IDG),
noninvestment real GNP (N), the real monetary base (B/P), and the
money multiplier. All variables (except m) are expressed as percentage
ratios to natural real GNP, and beneath the residuals the table shows
the level ofthese ratios in 1929:2, ranging from 5.6% for the monetary
base to 77.6% for noninvestment real GNP. Here we treat the behavior
of noninvestment real GNP as representing "consumption," actually
nondurable consumption, since in 1929 nondurable consumption made321 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Table 5.9 Residuals ("Innovations") in Interwar VAR Model: 1929:1 to
1932:4
Cycle MSTR MDG aN MJIP am
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1929:1 0.77* 0.05 1.10 -0.38* 0.12*
1929:2 0.10 -0.29 -0.89 -0.10 -0.04
1929:3 -1.29** 0.41 3.10** -0.08 0.02
1929:4 -1.20** - 1.11** -1.07 -0.21 -0.03
1930:1 -0.14 -0.13 -1.45 -0.08 0.04
1930:2 -0.03 -0.48 -1.35 -0.11 0.02
1930:3 -1.17** -0.36 -0.11 -0.22 -0.05
1930:4 -0.12 -0.19 -0.55 -0.01 0.01
1931:1 -0.21 -0.46 0.81 0.34* -0.07
1931:2 -0.21 0.04 1.27 -0.14 -0.09*
1931:3 -0.54 -0.45 -2.01* 0.40* -0.21**
1931:4 0.10 0.09 -0.65 0.04 -0.09*
1932:1 -0.69 0.32 0.10 0.21 -0.04
1932:2 0.08 0.10 -0.35 0.07 -0.01
1932:3 0.63 0.15 -1.42 -0.35* 0.06
1932:4 0.34 0.02 0.67 0.29 0.03
Level in
1929:2 12.2 12.2 77.6 5.6 4.4
Cumulative residuals
1929-30 -3.08 -2.10 -1.22 -1.19 0.17
1931-32 -0.46 -0.23 -1.58 0.86 -0.42
Cumulative residuals as
percentage of1929:2 level
1929-30 -25.2 -17.2 -1.6 -20.5 3.9
1931-32 -3.8 -1.9 -2.0 14.8 -9.5
Note: Asterisks are used to denote residuals as follows: (*) indicates between 1.0 and
1.5 times the sample period standard error, and (**) indicates more than 1.5 times the
standard error.
up 85.2% of N, and it accounted for 74.6~~ of the decline in N from
1929 to 1930.
The emphasis in this paper on autonomous movements in invest-
ment, particularly structures investment, is supported in table 5.9.
There were three large negative innovations in 1929-30 to ISTR,
including one in 1929:3, one quarter before the business downturn
and stock market crash. There was a large negative innovation in
IDG in 1929:4. The cumulative residuals of ISTR and IDG in 1929-
30 amount, respectively, to - 25.2% and - 17.2% of their levels in
1929:2. In contrast, the only large N residual for 1929-30 is positive
in 1929:3. The cumulative N residuals in 1929-30 amount to only
- 1.6% of its level in 1929:2. Thus we find no evidence that negative322 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
residuals for nondurables consumption played a key role in the initial
stages of the Great Contraction.
Two other interesting results are evident in table 5.9. First, there are
substantial negative innovations in the real monetary base beginning
as early as 1929:1 and cumulating to - 20.5% of the 1929:2 level in
1929-30. Second, the largest cumulative negative residuals in the pe-
riod 1931-32 are contributed by the money multiplier, supporting a
role for bank failures and the credit contraction in aggravating the
contraction. Especially interesting is the large negative multiplier in-
novation in 1931:3, the quarter when the Fed tightened its policy fol-
lowing Britain's departure from the gold standard.
Overall, these results are consistent with our interpretation of two
sources of the business cycle, real and financial, with the negative
innovations in real investment playing a dominant role in 1929-30, and
with the nature of the negative financial innovations shifting from a
contribution of the monetary base in 1929-30 to one by the money
multiplier in 1931-32.
5.6 Summary and Conclusion
5.6.1 Methodology and Data Description
Most of the tests of "structural" investment equations that have
been carried out in the literature embody what Sims (1980a) calls "in-
credible" exclusion restrictions. The literature on the neoclassical in-
vestment paradigm embodies prior assumptions about the form ofthe
production function. In its putty/putty version it neglects expectations
entirely, and in its putty/clay version it fails to allow time series ag-
gregate variables to play multiple roles in the formation ofexpectations
in different phases ofthe investment process. As a result, coefficients
on variables like lagged output and interest rates cannot be interpreted
in the structural way that has been typical in the literature.
The Tobin Q theory starts from a plausible point of departure but
then takes itselftoo seriously, allowing only Q to influence investment.
There seems to be no reason the single Q variable, whether or not it
is measured with error, should embody all influences ofother variables
on the investment process. Ourdiscussion emphasizes in particular the
role ofasymmetric adjustment costs, as well as the trade-offfirms face
between costly alternatives when the stock market gives one set of
signals and output or other variables give a conflicting set.
We conclude that the difficulties of structural equation building are
irremediable. As a substitute we carry out a hybrid methodology, in
which theory is used to suggest sets of variables and their form but323 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
empirical estimation is carried out by estimating equations in the sym-
metric VAR format, with all explanatory variables entering the invest-
ment equation and with the dependent variable included with the same
numberoflags. Ourhybridapproachthus combinesinsightsfrom struc-
tural models with the unconstrained approach to testing and data ex-
ploration that typifies investigations using VAR models.
Our first empirical task is to establish the importance of fixed in-
vestment in historical business cycles. Using procedures described in
the appendix, we have created a new set of quarterly data on major
expenditure components ofGNP extending back to 1919: 1. We include
four types of real investment expenditures in our study-producers'
durable equipment, nonresidential structures, residential structures,
and consumer durables expenditures. The decline in the sum of these
four components (I) contributes between one-third and one-halfofthe
decline in real GNP in recessions, even though the share ofI in GNP
at the typical business cycle peak is about one-quarter. Total invest-
ment actually was relatively more important in postwar recessions
between 1957 and 1980 than it was during the Great Contraction of
1929-33.
A decomposition of variance allows a description of the relation
between investment (I) and noninvestment real GNP (N) in major ep-
isodes. The interwar years were characterized by a high own variance
of investment, particularly in 1919-29, and after 1929 by a high co-
variance between I and N. The own variance ofN was more important
in the postwar period and was dominated by the Korean War episode.
Of the four components of investment, the own variance of nonresi-
dential structures was the largest in the interwar period, while the own
variance ofconsumer durables expenditures was largest in the postwar
period.
5.6.2 Implications for Four Schools of Thought
Keynesians, monetarists, neoclassicists~,and Q advocates all have
an interest in the results of this investigation. Members ofeach group
will be disappointed with our results if they are seeking support of
"monocausal" or "onefactor" hypotheses ofinvestmentbehavior. Yet
ironically the empirical findings offer some solace to each group, be-
cause they provide substantial support for an eclectic view of invest-
ment that blends elements ofeach approac.h while providing evidence
against opponents ofeach who insist on some alternative monocausal
explanation.
Keynesians view investment behavior as containing a substantial
autonomous component. Our empirical investment equations sum-
marized in table 5.6, together with the historical decompositions in
figures 5.4 to 5.7, support the view that autonomous innovations in324 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
structures investment are an important driving force in the business
cycle. In table 5.8 the effect of innovations in structures investment
on durable equipment expenditures, as well as on noninvestment GNP,
is greaterthan the reverse feedback from equipmentand noninvestment
GNP innovations to structures investment, in both the interwar and
the postwar periods. The boom in structures investment between 1923
and 1929, the subsequent slump in the 1930s, and the smaller negative
innovations in the early 1960s and boom in 1971-73 all can be viewed
mainly as autonomous events rather than as a passive reaction to other
economic variables.
While monetarists would doubtless be unhappy with a view that
treats major swings in structures investment as autonomous, they
nevertheless have the consolation oflearning that the response ofboth
structures and equipment investment to the real money supply is sig-
nificantly greaterthantothe''traditional" variables in investmentequa-
tions, the accelerator (output change), the user cost ofcapital, and Q.
The effect of money, split here between the real monetary base and
the Ml money multiplier, is substantial in both the interwar and the
postwar periods. The regression results in table 5.6 find a strong impact
ofboth the base and multiplier on equipment investment in the interwar
period, and on both structures and equipment investment in the post-
war. The historical decompositions in figures 5.4 to 5.7 indicate that
baseinnovations hadan importantimpact onboth structures and equip-
ment investment, as well as on noninvestment GNP, in the interwar
period, whereas the multiplier played a role in both the interwar and
the postwar periods.
It seems ironic that this study ofinvestment behavior provides more
support for the general views ofthe economy represented by Keynes-
ians and monetarists than it does for the views of specialists in the
investment process, the neoclassicists and Q advocates. In tables 5.4
and 5.5 the user cost ofcapital for businesses and the real interest rate
for households are insignificant or have the wrong signs in every equa-
tion for the interwar years. The equations for consumer and producer
durables spending exhibit a significant and correctly signed (negative)
sum ofcoefficients for the postwar period, but in every postwar equa-
tion the user cost or interest rate variable fails an "exclusion test" on
the joint significance of all lagged values in the explanation of invest-
ment spending. The verdict on the Q approach is even more negative.
In the aggregated regression equations of table 5.6, the Q variable
passes the exclusion test only in one equation, for postwar structures
investment. This appears in table 5.4 to be attributable to the nonres-
idential component of structures investment. Such results pose a new
task for Q theorists, that is, to determine what factors would make325 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
investment in structures more responsive to Qthan investment in pro-
ducers' durable equipment.
Our empirical work casts doubt on the irrLportance ofthe accelerator
hypothesis of investment behavior that has been supported by some
past work, for example, Clark (1979). The simple device of including
four lags on the dependent variable in equations explaining total I
eliminates the significant explanatory contribution of lagged values of
real GNP, except in the equipment equations for the postwar period.
However, we find that it is possible to obtain significant sums ofcoef-
ficients for an accelerator effect in a postwar durable equipment equa-
tion only when real GNP is entered as a second rather than a first
difference. These findings support our basic interpretation that there
is a sharp difference between the behavior ofstructures and equipment
investment, with theformer behaving mainly in an autonomous fashion,
whereas the latter reflects feedback both from investment in structures
and from financial and monetary variables.
5.6.3 Deeper Issues and Unsettled Questions for Future Research
In a recent paper Blanchard (1981, 154) reached the conclusion that
"the multiplier is dead and the accelerator alive." This paper reaches
the opposite conclusion, particularly for the structures component of
investment. The accelerator mechanism, interpreted as the feedback
from autonomous movements in noninvestment GNP to investment in
structures, seems to be considerably weaker than the multiplier mech-
anism, interpreted in the elementary textbook fashion as the effect on
total GNP of autonomous movements of investment, particularly the
structures component. Although there is a substantial effect of mon-
etary and financial variables on investment, nevertheless there are ma-
jor and persistent movements in investment that occur in both the
interwar and the postwar periods that cannot be explained by prior
changes in output, money, stock prices, or interest rates.
That we label major movements in structures investment ""autono-
mous" does not mean we leave them unexplained. Rather, this basic
interpretation of the paper treats structurt~S investment as exogenous
with respect to the explanatory variables included in our statistical
analysis. This does not rule out other explanations, and in fact we can
offer three complementary explanations of the behavior of structures
investmentin the interwarperiod. First, the residential structures boom
of the 1920s and subsequent slump of the 1930s can be explained in
part by demographic factors that lie outside the scope of this paper.
While the rapid population growth of 1900-1920, together with the
postponement of construction during World War I and the 1920-21
recession, may provide a partial explanation of the intensity of the326 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
1920s residential construction boom, the restrictive immigration law of
1924 and subsequent deceleration in population growth may help to
account for the decline in residential construction after 1926.
Hickman (1973) has documented both the effect of the decline in
population growth on the desired housing stock and also the extent of
overbuilding in the mid-1920s. Hickman's work treats the rate ofpop-
ulation growth as endogenous, with the rate of household formation
responding to the growth rate ofincome, and he is able to decompose
the observed decline in the rate ofpopulation growth betweenthe early
1920s and mid-1930s into two components-that due to the effect of
declining income, and a remaining exogenous decline due primarily to
the decline in immigration. To isolate the effect ofthe exogenous com-
ponent ofthe decline in household formation, Hickman calculated two
dynamic simulations of his model, one in which standardized house-
holds are assumed to increase steadily at the 1924-25 rate of growth
and anotherin which income and othereconomic variables are identical
but in which standardized households follow their actual declining path
after 1925. The impact ofthe actual demographic slump gradually be-
comes more important as the 1930s progress, accounting for a decline
in housing starts between the two simulations of 28.3% for 1933 and
39.1% for 1940. His result is consistent with our figure 5.4 above, in
which the own innovation in structures investment is negative through-
out the 1930s.
A second factor, more relevant for investment in structures than in
equipment, is the element of speculation. The Florida land boom of
the 1920s, the stock market "bubble" of 1928-29, and earlier invest-
ment excesses like the "South Seas Bubble" of the early eighteenth
century all have some similarity to the construction boom ofthe 1920s.
For six years (1923-28) real residential construction achieved a level
more than double the average of the entire decade before World War
I, and in four successive years (1924-27) the ratio of real residential
construction investment to GNP reached by far its highest level ofthe
twentieth century. Hickman estimates that even with a continuation of
population growth at the 1924-25 rate rather than a post-1925 decline,
housing starts would have fallen by 35% between 1925 and 1930 (as a
ratio to natural real GNP, real residential investment actually fell by
57%).
Nor is the phenomenon of overbuilding confined to the interwar
period. Figure 5.6 shows that the postwarown innovation to structures
investment peaked in 1972-73. Several years later contemporary ac-
counts recognized the phenomenon ofoverbuilding: "In Chicago, new
apartment construction has just about ceased. In Atlanta, where there
is at least a three-year supply of unsold condominiums overhanging
the market, mortgage companies are auctioning off high-rise units to327 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
the public at two-thirds their original asking price.... The current
problems stem fromm overbuilding in the early 1970s" ("The Great
High-Rise Bust," Newsweek, 30 August 1976, 5).
The third factor that may be an important explanation behind the
apparently "autonomous" structures investment boom of the 1920s
and slump of the 1930s is the "Schumpeterian" bunching of innova-
tions. This hypothesis is developed by R. A. Gordon (1951), who ar-
gued that the buoyancy ofboth residential and nonresidential construc-
tion in the 1920s reflected in large part the influence ofthe automobile
in expanding the boundaries ofurban areas:
Between 1923 and 1929 the growing use of automobiles and trucks
had a more important impact on total investment and employment
than did the expansion of motor vehicle output. Motor vehicle
registrations in 1929 were about 75 percent greater than in 1923
and nearly three times the number in 1920.... large scale invest-
ment was necessary for roads and bridges, oil wells, pipe lines,
garages and service stations, and tire and automobile supply stores,
as well as for oil refining and tire manufacture. In addition, the
automobile accelerated the trends toward urbanization and "sub-
urbanization," stimulating thereby residential and commercial
building.
Other industries were also involved in the bunching of investment
opportunities in the 1920s. Among these were electric power-well
over half the installation of electric generating capacity during 1902-
40 occurred during the decade of the 1920s. Other important new in-
dustries were radio, telephone, and chemicals.
The results in this paper support the view that there are two basic
impulses in the business cycle, real and financial. The real impulse
appears in our statistical evidence as an autonomous innovation to
investment in structures. This concluding section has suggested three
factors that may underlie the cycle in structures investment. We choose
to emphasize this element ofinvestment behavior here because it has
received relatively little attention in recent research, however familiar
it may seem to experts on the earlier literature on business cycles. The
financial impulse works through the effect on investment of changes
in the monetary base and money multiplier, as well as the real interest
rate for postwar investment in durable equipment. In these results the
money multiplier may be acting as a proxy for such phenomena as the
banking contraction of 1929-33 and the episodes of credit crunches
and disintermediation in the postwar years.
Many avenues for future research are opened up by these results.
Past studies ofstructures investment need to be reviewed for problems
of identification and simultaneity that may have led to a misleading328 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
emphasis onthe investmentaccelerator, ratherthan autonomous move-
ments, as the driving force behind structures investment. Our inability
to find a strong influence of the stock market (working through our Q
variable) on investment, except for postwar nonresidential structures,
needs to be reconciled with the recent findings ofFischer and Merton
(1984), who find a stronger connection between economic activity and
prior movements in the stock market. Finally, we hope that our new
quarterly interwar data on components of expenditures will stimulate
further research into the interrelations of real and financial variables
during the Great Depression.
Appendix
General Description
This appendix investigates the behavior ofinvestment in the United
States economy over both the interwar (1919-41) and the postwar
(1947-1983) periods. Annual nominal and real expenditures and defla-
tor series are available as far back as 1929 using Survey of Current
Business supplements (hereafterSCB). Before 1929, however, one must
resort to a numberofsources to collect annual datathatcan be matched
up to the 1929Commerce Departmentfigures. Swansonand Williamson
(1971) contains nominal series for all the major national account cat-
egories for the period 1919 to 1928, which have been adjusted from
Kuznets's figures to conform to the SCB definitions. These annual
nominal series are used here for all the national accounts categories
except for investment in structures and foreign trade. The desired di-
vision ofinvestment into residential and nonresidential structures uses
figures from Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (1956) and adjusts nominal
GNP accordingly. Net exports are broken down into the two nominal
components, exports and imports, using index available in the Statis-
tical History ofthe United States, which are then linked to the 1929
SCB values.
This provides us with a complete set of annual nominal national
income accounts. The next task is to find implicit deflators for these
nominal series. Our starting point is the set of SCB implicit deflators
forall the nationalincome categoriesfor theperiod 1929to 1941. Annual
figures for the GNP deflator, 1919-28, are obtained by linking Kuz-
nets's GNP deflator to the SCB 1929 implicit GNP deflator. Since both
current and constant dollar index are available for exports and imports,
it is possible to construct implicit deflators for both series from 1919
to 1928 thatcanbematchedtothe SCB 1929deflators. Fortheremaining329 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
categories, suchas consumptionandinvestment, deflators are notavail-
able for the period 1919-28. To obtain figures for this period, our
interpolation program is run over the available annual price series,
1929-41, to produce quarterly figures. The final regression is used to
"back forecast" the quarterly values over the period 1919-28. These
quarterly values are then averaged to yield annual price series for 1919-
28. With the complete set of price deflators it is possible to convert
the nominal national accounts into real series covering the full period
1919-41. The real annual national account series are interpolated to
arrive at a complete set ofreal quarterly accounts and a corresponding
set of deflators.
An interpolation procedure following that ofChow and Lin (1971) is
used in converting the annual series to quarterly observations. A more
complicated procedure, such as that suggested by Litterman (1981), is
deemed too costly compared with the possible gain in accuracy. The
procedure itself is fairly simple. Since our annual series are annual
averages of quarterly variables, the procedure we use is that termed
"distribution" by Chow and Lin. In what follows upper-case letters
represent annual series, and lower-case letters represent the associated
quarterly series. To each annual series to be interpolated (Yit) is as-
sociated a number of quarterly series (Xit) that a priori information
suggests move within the year the way quarterly observations on the
annual dependent variable would. These quarterly explanatory vari-




It is assumed in each interpolation that the quarterly errors follow an
AR(l) process, which induces a complicated covariance structure on
the annual error, Ut • The first autocorrelation of Ut , PA' is related to
the quarterly autocorrelation coefficient, PQ~I by the nonlinear formula:
_ pb + 2p~ + 3pb + 4pQ + 3p~ + 2pb + PQ
PA -
2p~ + 4pb + 6pb + 4
Estimating PA as the first autocorrelation of the residuals from the
regression in (AI), we can obtain an estimate of PQ by solving (A2),
and this is used in an iterative GLS procedure to obtain estimates of
f3 and PQ- The final estimates from this procedure are then used to
generate quarterly observations for the dependent variable as:
(A3)
The assumption ofAR(l) errors in the quarterly equation overcomes
the artificial choppiness induced if Ut is assumed to be white noise.330 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
This procedure is used to derive the quarterly series for the implicit
deflators and real series ofthe national accounts as well as Summers's
Q and some components ofthe cost ofcapital.
Sources ofAnnual Interwar and Postwar Quarterly Variables
1. GNP
1919-28(annual): Implicit deflator constructedfrom a nominal and
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and Employment. Nominal GNP taken from Swanson and Wil-
liamson (1971, table B-1), adjusted for the use of the investment
in structures series takenfrom Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (1956).
1919-41 (quarterly): The quarterly series for the GNP deflator was
calculated by adding up the real and nominal interpolated account
categories, except inventories, and dividing the nominal sum by
the real sum.
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Nominal GNP series from
SCB table 1.1. Implicit deflator from SCB table 7.1. All references
to SCB figures are updated through June 1984.
2. Consumer Durables Expenditures
1919-28 (annual): Nominal expenditures from Swanson and Wil-
liamson (1971, table B-2). Implicit deflator constructed from inter-
polation.
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Nominal series from SCB
table 1.1, deflator from SCB table 7.1.
3. Consumer Nondurables and Services
1919-28 (annual): Implicit deflator constructed from interpolation.
Nominal series is the sum of consumer semidurables, perishables,
and services from Swanson and Williamson (1971, table B-2).
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Nominal and real series are
the sum ofconsumer durables and service.s from SCB tables 1.1 and
1.2 with the implicit deflator defined as the ratio ofthe nominal sum
to the real sum.
4. Investment in Producers' Durable Equipment
1919-28(annual): Implicit price deflatorfrom interpolation, nominal
series from Swanson and Williamson (1971, table B-3).
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Nominal and real series are
the sum ofthe corresponding residential and nonresidential invest-
ment in producers' durable equipment from SCB tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Implicit deflator is the ratio of the nominal sum to the real sum.
5. Investment in Residential Structures
1919-28 (annual): Implicit deflator from interpolation. Nominal se-
ries taken from Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (1956, table K-4,
col. 4), does not include residential investment in farm structures.
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): N'ominal series for residen-
tial construction, nonfarm takenfrom SCBtable 1.1, implicitdeflator
taken from SCB table 7.1.
6. Investment in Nonresidential Structures
1919-28 (annual): Implicit deflator from interpolation. Nominal se-
ries from Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (1956, table K-4, col. 5),
includes farm investment in structures.
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Real and nominal series are
the sum of nonresidential and residential farm investment in struc-332 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
tures, SCB tables 1.1 and 1.2. Implicit deflator is arrived at by
dividing the nominal sum by the real sum.
7. Change in Business Inventories
1919-41 (quarterly): Both real and nominal series were arrived at
as residuals by subtracting from total real (nominal) GNP the real
(nominal) sum of all other account categories.
1947-83 (quarterly): Both real and nominal series taken from SCB
tables 1.1 and 1.2.
8. Government Purchases ofGoods and Services
1919-28 (annual): Price deflator from the interpolation, nominal
purchases from Swanson and Williamson (1971, table B-1).
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Deflator from SCB table 7.1
and nominal series from SCB table 1.1.
9. Exports
1919-28(annual): Real and nominal series constructed by matching
constant and current dollar index from the Statistical History ofthe
United States, series U21 and U22, to the SCB export series in 1929.
The deflator was then defined as the ratio for the real and nominal
series.
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Deflator from SCB table 7.1
and nominal series from SCB table 1.1.
10. Imports
1919-28(annual): Real and nominal series constructedbymatching
constant and current dollar index from the Statistical History, se-
ries U33 and U34, to the SCB import series in 1929. The deflator
is then defined as the ratio of the real and nominal series.
1929-41 (annual); 1947-83 (quarterly): Deflator from SCB table
7.1 and nominal series from SCB table 1.1.
11. Capital Stock, Equipment and Structures
1925-83 (annual): Nominal and real series for the two types of
capital stock, equipment and structures, was taken from various
issues of SCB. Nominal and real series for the capital stock of
consumer durables was taken from Musgrave (1979). To utilize the
information available from our associated quarterly investment se-
ries in constructingeach quarterly capital stock series, we followed
the iterative procedure: (a) the annual series provide a beginning
and ending value for the capital stock; (b) assuming a fixed ex-
ponential rate of depreciation, the quarterly series must satisfy
Kt = It + (1 - &)Kt _ 1. The procedure uses the starting value of
the capital stock and the associated quarterly It series, iterating on
&until the value of the quarterly capital stock at the end of the
period is "close" to the specified ending value. Below we present
the estimatedannualdepreciation ratefor eachtype ofcapital stock


















Rental Price of Capital Services
The rental price ofcapital services, for equipment and for structures,
was constructed using for equipment:
CE =
P~&E + r)(1 - RITCE - DUM · ZE · TAX . RITCE - ZE · TAX)
(1 - TAX)
and for structures:
C - PsCbs + r)(1 - RITCs - Zs . TAX)
s - (1 - TAX) .
A composite costofcapital series was constructedby weighting eachof
CE and Cs by their share in the sum ofthe capital stock ofequipment
and structures. Individual components ofthe costofcapital services are:
&E = Depreciation rate of the net stock of producers' durable
equipment estimated iteratively as explained above.
&s = Depreciation rate ofthe net stock ofnonresidential structure
estimated iteratively as above.
DUM = Dummy variable, set equal to 1.0 for the duration of the
Long amendment to the Revenue Act of 1962 and set equal
to zero in all other periods.
PE = Implicit deflator for investment in producers' durable equip-
ment, as explained above.
PI = Implicit deflator for investment in nonresidential structures,
as explained above.
RITCE = Rate ofinvestment tax credit onequipmentinvestment, from
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).
RITCs = Rate of investment tax credit on nonresidential structures
investment, from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).
TAX = Highest marginal tax rate on corporate income from Tax
Foundation (1979).
r = Discount rate, which is calculated as the Moody's Baa cor-
porate bond yield minus the expected rate of inflation. The
construction ofthe expected inflation rate is discussed in the
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ZE = Present value ofone dollar's worth ofdepreciation on equip-
ment. Figures for 1947-83 are from Jorgenson and Sullivan
(1981), while figures for 1919-41 are calculated using straight-
line depreciation, average asset life for the period from Jor-
genson and Sullivan and the Baa corporate bond rate.
Zs = Present value of one dollar's worth ofdepreciation on non-
residential structures. Figures for 1947-83 are from Jorgen-
son and Sullivan (1981), while figures for 1919-41 are cal-
culated using straight-line depreciation, average asset life for
the period from Jorgenson and Sullivan, and the Baa cor-
porate bond rate.
Sources of Interwar Quarterly Variables
The data utilized in this section were made available, in part, by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The
data for macroeconomic time series were originally collected by the











Constant term used in the regression.
Index of total construction, s.a. Monthly observations
from NBER tape, dataset 02A Construction: data orig-
inally collected for Engineering News-Record Yearbook.
= Consumer price index, all items, s.a.
= Consumer price index, less food, s.a. Monthly obser-
vations for both taken from NBER tape, datasest 04A
Prices: data originally collected by the Bureau ofLabor
Statistics.
= Index of composite wages, s.a. Monthly observations
from NBERtape, dataset08A IncomeandEmployment:
data originally collected by the Federal Reserve Board
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
= Physical volume ofdepartment store sales, s.a. Monthly
observations taken from NBER tape, dataset 06A Dis-
tribution of Commodities: data originally collected by
the Federal Reserve Board.
= Index ofindustrial production, total, s.a.
= Indexofindustrialproduction, durable consumergoods,
s.a.
= Indexofindustrialproduction, durable consumergoods,
s.a.
= Index of industrial production, producers' goods, s.a.
Monthly observations onthe four variables above taken
from NBER tape, dataset 01A Production ofCommod-
ities: data originally collected by the Federal Reserve
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QNRSTR = Real value of contracts for industrial buildings, s.a.
Quarterly observations arrived at by deflating the value
ofcontracts for industrial buildings (from NBER tape,
dataset 02B Construction: data originally collected by
the Federal Reserve Board) by the interpolated deflator
for nonresidential structures.
= Real value of residential construction contracts, s.a.
Quarterly observations arrived at by deflating value of
residential contracts (from NBER tape, dataset 02B
Construction: data originally collected by Engineering
News-Record) by the interpolated deflator for residen-
tial structures.
QMPROXY = Constructed variable for real imports, s.a. A quarterly
nominal series on imports, which did not match the SCB
definition, was deflated by the interpolated WPI. The
nominal import series was takenfrom NBERtape, data-
set 07A Foreign Trade: data originally appeared in the
Monthly Summary ojForeign Commerce, various issues.
QXPROXY = Constructed variable for real exports, s.a. A quarterly
nominal series on exports, which did not match the SCB
definition, was deflated by the interpolated WPI. The
nominal export series was taken from NBERtape, data-
set 07A Foreign Trade: data originally appeared in the
Monthly Summary ojForeign Commerce, various issues.
= Yield oncorporatebonds, Moody's Baarating. Monthly
observations originally collected by Moody's Investors
Service, taken from Federal Reserve Board and various
issues ofthe Federal Reserve Bulletin.
RHCPBD = Yield on corporate bonds, highest rating. Monthly ob-
servationsfrom NBERtape, dataset 13A InterestRates:
data originally collected by the United States Depart-
ment ofCommerce.
STKPRCE = Index ofall common stock prices, New York Stock Ex-
change. Monthlyobservationsfrom NBERtape, dataset
llASecurity Markets: dataoriginally collected by Stan-
dard and Poor's.
= Trend term appearing in the regression.
= Wholesale price index, all items, s.a. Monthly obser-
vations takenfrom NBERtape, dataset04A Prices: data
originally collected by Babson Statistical Organization.336 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
Comment John Geweke
In their paper Gordon and Veitch have made a commendable and in-
tellectually honest effort to compare the relationship between fixed
investment and other important macroeconomic variables during the
interwar period and in two postwar periods. Their strongest empirical
finding is a sharp difference between the interwar and postwar periods,
fixed investment being more nearly autonomous before the war than
after. By contrast, there is little evidence of shifts since World War II.
In common with many o.ther researchers, they conclude that measur-
able variants ofTobin's Qhave little explanatory power in an equation
for aggregate fixed investment. In contrast with some other empirical
work using aggregate data, they find no evidence for an accelerator, at
least a limited role for a cost ofcapital variable in the postwar era, and
substantial feedback from the monetary base, the monetary multiplier,
or both, to fixed investment.
In reaching these conclusions the authors employ an econometric
model with many fewer prior constraints than are typically found in
the empirical aggregate investment literature. They point out that a
reduced-form equation for aggregate investment, like their (8), is hope-
lessly underidentified without restrictions for which there are no sound
theoretical arguments. While I find this argument persuasive, I think
there is a more fundamental criticism of the use of "representative
agent" models to achieve identification of parameters estimated from
aggregate data, to which I shall return. The authors abandon the con-
ventional approach in favor of a methodology described as a combi-
nation ofthe vector autoregression (VAR) approach with the estimation
ofreduced-form equations suggested by traditional theory. Experience
suggests that evaluation of the paper's empirical results is likely to be
overshadowed by an effort to delineate economic interpretations that
are admissible from those that are inadmissible on the basis of this
"hybrid" methodology. It may therefore be useful to provide an inter-
pretation of this methodology complementary to the authors'.
Prior considerations-from economic theory or at any rate from
professional common sense-are used at two points in the formulation
ofthe model. The first is in the choice ofthe variables that will appear;
short ofthe most blatant data mining imaginable, this use of "theory"
is indispensable. The second use of prior considerations is the (iden-
tifying) restriction that the relevant structural econometric model is
block recursive, in the classical sense, with the investment equation
John Geweke is professor of economics at Duke University.
Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Sloan Foundation is
gratefully acknowledged.337 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
being the sole occupant of its block. The position of the investment
block within the system determines which contemporaneous variables
appear on the right-hand side ofthis equation. The authors argue, very
much in the spirit ofHerman Wold, that the investment equation comes
first, with no contemporaneous variables on the right-hand side. Given
the restriction to block causal chain models, that further restriction
seems quite reasonable, buttable 5.8 suggests the decision does matter.
The assertion that a causal chain model of this form is structural is
necessary for the interpretations ofthe estimates made throughout the
latter part of the paper: without it, for example, the coefficients on
output have no direct bearing on the accelerator hypothesis, and coef-
ficients on the cost of capital cannot be associated with the supply of
capital.
The hypothesis thatthe relevant structuralmodel involves a specified
list of variables in a specified causal chain is structure of a minimal
sort. Whether one calls the model theoretical oratheoretical is a matter
of taste; "minimally structural" seems more precise. What is much
more important is to delineate the kinds ofconceptual experiments that
can be conducted and the kinds ofhypotheses that can be tested in the
context of such a model. The vector ofdisturbances for each block of
equations is identified, and so one can ask about the effects on endog-
enous variables ofcertain kinds ofvariation in these disturbances. (We
seem to learn most about such systems when examining the effects of
very artificial movements in the disturbances, such as one-time shocks
[Sims 1980a] or sine and cosine waves [Ge\veke 1983].) This point is a
rather simple one; confusion usually arises if the notion that the or-
dering ofthe variables in the system is merely a normalization is paired
with subsequent reference to a disturbance as a shock to a particular
variable. The latter interpretation presumes a causal chain structure.
The true assumptions and legitimate applications of the VAR models
in this paper, and in the earlier work ofSims, are the same. The preem-
inent hypothesis that can be tested using this methodology is that of
no structural change in one or more blocks from one regime to another.
The methodology employed here is therefore one approach well suited
to the theme of the conference.
Nothing else in the model is identified. As the authors have pointed
out, what appears on the right-hand side is a confounding of deter-
minants ofdesired capital stock, gestation lags, and variables that enter
through the information set employed in the formation ofexpectations.
It is precisely in this sense that the investment equation is a reduced
form. This fact must be employed carefully in interpreting the empirical
findings in the paper. The presence of money and capital costs in the
postwar investment equation and the absence of output effects when
the investment block appears first rather than second are interesting338 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
food for thought. But the joint insignificance ofcoefficients on output
in the investment equation is only circumstantial evidence that the
accelerator is dead: the accelerator could simply be hiding behind an
expectations mechanism and a monetary authority that tightens credit
during booms. "Missing and presumed dead" might be a better ap-
pellation. Certainly either is preferred to "dead on arrival" in an ar-
bitrarily overidentified ambulance.
I would like to return now to the predicament described in the first
part of the paper, which provided the justification for applying a min-
imally structural model to aggregate data. The authors develop a model
in which gross investment is a function ofthe expected price ofcapital
services, expected output, decision lags, delivery lags, gestation lags,
the current capital stock, the price of all other inputs, and (certainly
not least) the variables upon which expectations are conditioned. They
conclude that these functional relationships cannot b.e disentangled
from anestimable equationwithout some heroic andentirely unjustified
assumptions about each relationship. The model they set forth is not
a "deep parameter" model, in that it is not derived from engineering
technology and the preference functions of firm managers, but that is
probably beside the point. I suspect that any deep parameter model
would have beenmore prone to the identificationproblems posed. Their
argument persuasively illustrates the incredibility of common over-
identifying restrictions on investment equations. That alone should
make us skeptical ofreported estimates and their interpretation. In this
sense, no more is needed. However, greater megatonnage could have
been brought to bear in the attack; the stronger attack would in turn
suggest some approaches complementary to the estimation of mini-
mally structural aggregate models.
Observe first of all that the problems cited in section 5.2 are not
peculiar to macroeconomic models or aggregate data. They exist even
for a single firm producing a single homogeneous output from capital
alone in a stationary stochastic state. Even for such a firm, the as-
sumptions made would most likely be inappropriate and unrealistic in
a model intended to be genuinely structural in an interesting variety of
circumstances. Much capital is in fact indivisible, and most investment
is in fact irreversible: log linear production functions may be reason-
able, but smooth delivery and gestation lags are not. Key investment
decisions typically revolve around "whether, when, and how much"
rather than taking the form of smooth adjustment to changing output
andprices. Economies and diseconomies ofscaleare criticalin deciding
whether to enter new markets. These inconvenient facts are not cited
by way of attacking the method of analysis per se: smooth problems
are tractable and have closed-form solutions, whereas realistic ones
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of technological parameters invariant under some kinds of policy
changes, this sort of objection is very much to the point. In formal
terms, if a true technology involving lumpy capital and irreversible
decisions is projected onto a smooth adjustment space, then we should
not expect that projection to remain undisturbed when nontechno-
logical dimensions ofthe environment are changed. Investment models
with closed-form solutions could not be applied seriously to firms ac-
counting for the majority of business fixed investment in the United
States. This observation is supported by the dearth ofsuchapplications
in the literature, especially at the deep parameter level.
The argument is even stronger when applied to investment in con-
sumerdurables andowner-occupiedresidential structures. Competitive
pressures may assure optimization and a homogeneous technology in
long-run industrial equilibrium, but the assumption that households
maximize homogeneous utility functions is much weaker.
Even if these problems were surmounted, industry by industry, the
problem of aggregation would remain. Necessary conditions for the
existence ofcapital aggregates and aggregate productionfunctions have
been known for a long time (see the surveys by Fisher 1969 and Muell-
bauer 1975). American Telephone and Telegraph, as newly constituted,
can produce long distance telephone service with capital alone-as the
next AT&T "strike" will remind us-and that precludes the existence
ofcapital aggregates (Fisher 1969, 558). In the art ofmacroeconometric
modeling it may be wise, for many purposes, to sweep the aggregation
problem under the rug. In explaining quarterly investment, however,
it is difficult to conclude that the problem is anything but central. To
take one example, consider the response ofbusiness fixed investment,
as defined in the national accounts, to alternative, fully specified paths
for monetary policy. Because ofvery great differences in gestation lags
and provisions for cancellation of orders in different industries, this
response must be presumed to depend to a large degree on the distri-
bution oforders and states ofcompletion ofprojects across industries.
To the extentthat these distributions, and otherrelevantfactors, cannot
be inferredfrom aggregate dataalone, we should observe very different
behavior offixed investment in different business cycles. This the au-
thors have documented, most vividly in their table 5.1.
To focus onthe capitalaggregation problemis, perhaps, to beata dead
horse in polite company. In a quarterly macroeconometric model ofin-
vestment, however, itis difficult toconcludethattheproblemis anything
but central. We would expect the aggregation issue to pose larger prob-
lems in modeling changes in levels ofcapital stocks, defined broadly as
"immobile factors of production," than in any other kind of macro-
economic modeling. To the extent that aggregation is the dominant dif-
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here that this is necessarily the case-we should expect that efforts to
nail down tightly "structural" relationships with aggregate data and to
elucidate common behavior across business cycles will be more futile
fortheinvestmentsectorthanforanyother. Inanyevent,theaggregation
argument implies that there cannotexist structuralrepresentative agent
models ofinvestment demand overthe business cycle. The frustrations
ofvarious empirical investigators cited in this paper, and the poor per-
formance ofinvestment models generally, probably are deeply rooted.
Considerations ofthese kinds ought to receive more weight in mod-
eling investment demand. They provide an argument against the ap-
plication ofoptimizing models that is complementary to the one in the
present paper in the case ofaggregate data, and they suggest that even
if the numerous identification problems could somehow be solved,
models would still be unstable and predict poorly from one business
cycle to the next. They suggest that "deep parameter" models are a
waste ofintellectual energy ifthe goal is to provide better predictions
of the behavior of aggregate time series and that they will not prove
structural if the representative firm assumption is taken literally.
Onthepositiveside,thereemergesamoreproductiveagendaforfuture
research.Themodelingofshort-runinvestmentdemandoughttoproceed
at a level at which the conditions for capital aggregation are more plau-
sible, oratwhich theaggregation problem reasonably appears to be sec-
ond order. At this level it might also be possible to use engineering and
institutionalconsiderationstoproducecrediblemodelsofthetechnology
and identifyingrestrictions thatwould sortoutthe multiple roles ofvari-
abIes. Realistic models are notlikely tobeofthelinearquadratic variety
with closed-form solutions, buttheadvance ofcomputing technology is
rapidly removing this constraint. Such a model with predictive power
significantlybeyondmechanicalextrapolationwouldbeaveryimportant
advance.Aggregatefixedinvestmentwould,inthisapproach,beattacked
sectorby sector. In the interim, minimally structuralapproachs like the
one taken here are useful in organizing statistical information and de-
veloping stylized facts ofaggregate behavior. Acceptance ofeither the
authors' identification argument orthe aggregation argument advanced
here implies that the minimally structural approach dominates repre-
sentative agent models with arbitrary identifying restrictions.
Comment Christopher A. Sims
Gordon and Veitch approach the analysis ofinvestment in the business
cycle in a style that, as they point out, is close to that employed by
Christopher A. Sims is professor of economics at the University of Minnesota.341 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Gordonand others in analyzinginflation using price equations and wage
equations. The data are treated carefully, with the complexities oftheir
dynamics drawn out and discussed in some detail. Interpretations are
explored both for the regularities persistent enough to affect equation
parameters and for the special episodes that show up as residuals. But
the interpretation is largely informal, with no attempt to construct an
explicit mapping from the empirical estimated parameters to a set of
"deeper" parameters.
I share Gordon and Veitch's skepticism to\vard empirical studies that
interpret data under a narrow set of ad hoc maintained hypotheses.
The combination ofcareful statistical treatm.ent ofthe data with infor-
mal interpretation ofthe statistical models is far more useful than the
reverse-elaborate formal interpretation of models that do not fit or
thathave not seriously confronted the datain all theircomplexity. Once
one moves away from a style ofresearchin whicha single overidentified
model is treated as a maintained hypothesis, results are likely to emerge
in the form of degrees of plausibility for various classes of interpre-
tations, and expressing such results formally will often, maybe even
usually, be impractical.
Nonetheless, informality in discussion of scientific research is only
an occasional practical necessity, not a virtue in itself. It carries with
it some pitfalls ofits own. Interpretation ofa statistical model, that is,
translation of the numerical properties of the data into conclusions
about the way people behave, necessarily involves making assump-
tions. Formal modeling makes these assumptions explicit. While it may
seem at times that in economics formality carried to enough of an
extreme gives professional license to make explicitly ridiculous as-
sumptions, informal interpretation of models may allow assumptions
to remain hidden.
Gordon and Veitch find implications in their results for Keynesian
theory, monetarist theory, "neoclassical" theory, and Q theory. They
also interpret some oftheir results as casting light on the relative strength
ofthe multiplier and the accelerator. All ofthis is done without explicit
fitting ofmodels embodying these theories orexplicitly identifying mul-
tiplier and accelerator with parameters in fitted statistical models. I
think it is worthwhile to examine more closely how these implications
are arrived at, not because I think most ofthem are wrong, but because
in the long run those that are correct will carry more weight if the
assumptions they are based on are more explicit.
The authors point out that the "theories" in conventional theoretical
discussions often are empty, having no implications for data without
auxiliary assumptions that their proponents leave implicit or indeter-
minate. This does make it frustrating to try to use formal models in
interpreting data. The econometrician is forced to make explicit the
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ifhe does this clearly in a contextwhere he treats more than one theory
as retaining plausibility, he is likely to be accused of not formulating
the theories "correctly." Infact, these implicit assumptions often exist
in many versions, with each "monetarist," "Keynesian," or "Q theo-
rist" having his own.
Nonetheless I think more formal modeling would have been possible
and helpful in this paper and would not necessarily have compromised
realistic assessment ofthe data. One can construct formal models ex-
emplifying various theories and discuss how far they are, in what di-
mensions, from fitting the data. Even where it is not practical to gen-
erate formal models that fit well, the qualitative character of such
models may be important in guiding our interpretations.
Old-Fashioned Keynesian Theory
The old-fashioned Keynesian theory is implicit in much of Gordon
and Veitch's discussion, as, for example, when they cite the size of
feedbacks found in a VAR model as relevant to the size of multiplier
(for feedback from investment) effects. Keynesian theory emphasizes
that investment is volatile and that consumption responds to it, via the
multiplier, so that investment fluctuations engender larger income fluc-
tuations. Accelerator theory in its original forms emphasizes the re-
sponse ofinvestment to the rate ofgrowth ofincome without, usually,
much emphasis on the notion that noninvestment expenditure has sub-
stantial volatility. Multiplier theory is usually presented with a dynamic
component-the idea ofrounds ofexpenditure propagating across sec-
tors, with "leakages." Accelerator theory has been presented with
various dynamic appendages to its basic notion that there is an instan-
taneous equilibrium relation between the rate ofgrowth ofincome and
the level of the capital stock.
Multiplier theory by itself, combining an assertion about where un-
predictable variation arises with a description ofhow it propagates, is
a theory with content. Itgains policy relevance ifone makes the further
identifyingassumptionthatdeliberatelyinducedchangesin government
expenditure or taxation will propagate in consumption with the same
dynamics as do the volatile shifts in investment expenditure. It can be
made testable by identifying the notion of "volatility" in investment
with the notion that investment should have substantial unpredictable
variance. Then unpredicted disturbances to investment should be fol-
lowed with some delay by increases in consumption, probably larger
than the increase in investment itself.
Samuelson's classic multiplier/accelerator paper showed how an ac-
celerator, with an arbitrary delay introduced into it, could strongly
affect the dynamics ofa multipliermodel. His model was notstochastic,
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might take a pure Keynesian multiplier/accelerator to be one in which
volatility in investment is the main generator of the business cycle,
with propagation through both multiplier and accelerator dynamics. I
know of no example of anyone's arguing strongly for the opposite, a
model in "Nhich shifts in consumption behavior are the main source of
volatility, with multiplier/accelerator dynamics still generating the cycle.
Such a model is clearly a logical possibility, however. More generally,
both consumer and investor behavior might be independent sources of
volatility.
If we estimate reduced-form regressions of consumption and in-
vestment on lagged investment and lagged consumption, that is, a two-
by-two VAR, we might then interpret the consumption regression as
reflecting consumer behavior, with its residual representing shifts in
such behavior and the investment equation as correspondingly repre-
senting investor behavior. Multiplier dynamics and accelerator dynam-
ics could then be read off from the MAR (moving average response)
representation of the VAR.
In this framework, the size and pattern of the MAR responses are
important to the interpretation. Ifthe multiplier mechanism is at work,
any shock, whether in consumption residuals, investment residuals, or
both, should lead to a sustained rise in consumption, probably larger
than the rise in investment, ifit leads to a sustained rise in investment.
It is therefore regrettable that, in giving us neither the VAR coefficients
nor plots of the MARs, Gordon and Veitch choose not to present the
information that would allow us to assess whether shocks really get
"multiplied," and ifso by what multiplier. They give us only statistical
significance on blocks of coefficients and variance-explained account-
ing. Neither tells us what we need to know to find the point estimates
of the dynamic multiplier.
The identifying assumptions we are using to distinguish consumption
disturbances from investment disturbances here rely on delays in re-
sponses. Ifthe two sorts ofdisturbances are distinct and responses are
delayed, we ought also to expect the VAR residuals to show little
correlation. (We are relying for identification of ideas close to those
put forth years ago by Herman Wold, as I pointed out in Sims 1981).
Investment and noninvestment innovations do not show small corre-
lation in all of the periods and categories Gordon and Veitch explore,
and in fact the strongest feedbacks occur precisely when contempo-
raneous correlations are strongest.
When identifying "multiplier" and "accelerator" with MAR feed-
backs, the notion that reduced-form residuals (innovations) in the two
equations can be identified with shifts in consumption and investment
behavior is critical. Gordon and Veitch do not make the connection
between this point and their choice ofaggregation scheme-household344 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
versus business or durable goods versus structures. They focus on
equation parameters as the basis for choice. But the degree oforthog-
onality of the disturbances is at least equally important. It is hard to
see a priori why there should be distinct durable goods and structures
shocks to household behavior, with delays in propagation ofthe shock
from one category to the other. The Keynesian notion that business
decisions may change for reasons not much related to consumer be-
havior, and that the results propagate into consumer decisions with a
delay, may be wrong, but at least it is supported by a plausible story-
consumers are credit constrained, or for other reasons they react di-
rectly to income flows with a transactions lag. If Gordon and Veitch
mean for us to take seriously the idea that household durable goods
consumption is subject to shocks distinct from household nondurable
goods consumption, and that these propagate with a delay into non-
durable consumption, a simple model showing how the notion works
would have been helpful.
The Expectational Accelerator
Gordon and Veitch point out that expectational accelerator models
are likely to be consistent with a variety ofdynamic behavior patterns
and hence to be underidentified. Such models do nonetheless provide
a possible framework for interpreting results like those in this paper.
In such a model, multiplier effects might still be read off from MAR
response patterns, but the idea that shocks to investment and con-
sumption equations separately represent consumption and investment
behavioral disturbances no longer holds. If shocks to consumption
behavior are persistent, small disturbances in it might generate large
changes in expectedfuture output, hencelarge, and undelayed, changes
in investment. Investment innovations might be a betterindex ofshifts
in consumption behavior than consumption innovations.





C(t) = a + bY(t - 1) + u(t)
K t = c(1 - h) L hiEt[Y(t + i)] + Vt
i=O
Y(t) = C(t) + K(t) - K(t - 1).
Equation (1) is the consumption function and (2) is the expectational
accelerator. In (2) it is asserted that the current capital stock is kept
at a fixed ratio to an exponentially weighted average offuture output
levels. For some ranges of its parameter values, the system has sta-
tionary solutions. Assuming, say, b = .94, c = 3.33, and h = .90, that345 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
at t investors know the values of current and past K and C, and that
u and v are each serially uncorrelated yields as autoregressive
representation
(4) C(t) = .94 C(t - 1) + .941(t - 1) + u(t)
(5) K(t) = 4.37 C(t - 1) - .28 K(t - 1) - 4.37 K(t - 2) + e/(t),
where e] is a linear combination of the original u and v. (Note that,
though the operator applied to K in [5] is not invertible, the system as
a whole is stable. Also note that to derive [4] and [5] we assume that
self-perpetuating exponential explosions in the capital stock are known
by investors not to be sustainable.)
Gordon and Veitch give us the analog of (5) in isolation. But in the
system (4) and (5), (5) cannot be interpreted in isolation. If we were
to treat (5) as an "accelerator equation" describing the response of
capital stock to consumption, in attempting to use it to generate a
distributed lag determining K from current and past C we would find
it implied explosive behavior for K. The usual trick for measuring
"long-run response" of K to C (dividing the coefficient on lagged C
by one minus the sumofcoefficients on lagged Ks) produces a negative
number. Furthermore, thoughthecoefficients in (4) and (5) areinvariant
to the variances ofthe disturbances in (1) through (3), the explanatory
power ofeach variable, and hence significance tests for blocks ofvari-
ables, is sensitive to those variances.
The moving average representation implied by (4) and (5), with the
variance of u about twice that of the "investment schedule" distur-
bance v, gives the following variance decomposition at the sixteen-
quarter horizon, with 1 first in the orthogonalization:
Explained by
% Variance in 1 C
1 92.8 7.2
C 91.3 8.7
Investmentappears as driving variation in consumptionin the model,
even though consumption schedule disturbances are larger. It does so
because an innovation in the consumption schedule generates an ex-
pectation ofsustained higher income and is therefore accompanied by
an immediate expansion ofinvestment. In fact, the proportion ofvari-
ance in investment explained by consumption innovations is lowest
when either investment or consumption shocks have relatively large
variance. Investment innovations tend to pick up the dominant source346 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
of disturbance to the system. When the two underlying shocks have
about equal variance, the proportion of variance in investment ex-
plained by consumption shocks rises to about 15%.
Using the kind of interpretation Gordon and Veitch apply at some
points in their paper, this model seems to show a strong multiplier and
little accelerator. Itis a model Keynesian in spirit-volatileinvestment,
driven by shifts in expectations, has large multiplier effects on con-
sumption-but it has an accelerator mechanism as an important part
of its transmission dynamics, and the consumption schedule in it is
more volatile than the investment schedule.
Cost of Capital Models
None of the foregoing models includes prices of any kind as an
explicit variable. They do not deny, however, that prices exist and are
likely to be correlated with real business cycle fluctuations. Multiplier
theory asserts that disturbances in investment expenditure propagate
into other components of GNP. It is quite consistent with this theory
that an investment disturbance should be associated with an interest
rate disturbance, either through financial market reactions or through
the reaction of investment to policy or foreign sector shifts. Thus
multiplier theory does not deny the possible explanatory power of
financial variables in a regression model of investment and nonin-
vestment spending. It does, however, suggest that if such financial
variables are included in the model its interpretation will become
much more complicated.
In all their reported results, except for a few regressions of invest-
ment on lagged investment and noninvestment, financial variables are
mixed in with real variables in a single system. This makes interpre-
tation of the results in the light of "real theories" like the multiplier/
accelerator difficult. Multiplier/accelerator theory does not say any-
thing about how much predictive power price and financial variables
should have. It does suggest likely patterns for the joint behavior of
investment and noninvestment MAR response paths even when prices
are in the model, but these are not discussed by Gordon and Veitch.
Gordon and Veitch interpret neoclassical and Q theory as predicting
that cost of capital variables should have a lot of predictive value for
investment. They also point out that these theories are partial equilib-
rium theories and really make no statement about how data should
behave. My view is that the question of how much predictive power
such variables have (and whether high cost of capital is predictive of
lower or higher investment) is interesting and important. It affects the
interpretation and plausibility for many theoretical approaches to busi-
ness cycles. However, it is not reasonable to think of the relative
predictive powers of such variables and lagged noninvestment as re-347 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
lating to a horse race between accelerator, Q, and neoclassical theories.
It is an interesting race, but these are not the horses performing-in
fact, these are not even horses.
Monetarist Theory
The comments of the preceding section apply here as well. That
monetary variables should have predictive value is not at all inconsis-
tentwith multiplier/acceleratortheory. Thedifference is thatmonetarist
theory, unlike Qand neoclassical investment theories, is seriously put
forward as a complete theory with implications for data, at least by
some of its proponents. That is, monetarists argue not only that there
is an equilibrium relation between money and real activity, but that
disturbances to monetary variables propagate into real variables with
a delay, are not explainable as systematic reaction to the real variables
themselves, and account for much of the observed business cycle.
Monetarist theory is therefore confirmed in Gordon and Veitch's
finding that monetary aggregates have substantial explanatory power
for investment. On the other hand, as I pointed out in the American
Economic Review paper Gordon and Veitch cite (Sims 1983), this con-
firmation is analogous to confirming the existence of an exploitable
trade-off between inflation and unemployment by regressing unem-
ployment on inflation: even in a model where monetary policy is totally
ineffective, a policy authority aiming at stabilizing the price level would
generate a path for money aggregates that would have great predictive
value for real variables. And this result applies both to the money stock
itself and to the base.
Conclusion
Gordon and Veitch have cleanly displayed the empirical regularities
that arf. the focus of their discussion. They have isolated some inter-
esting phenomena and given sensible interpretations of at least some
ofthem. Multiplier and monetarist theories each show some degree of
consistency with the data. Financial variables show substantial pre-
dictive power for investment. Investment contains a lot of unpredict-
able variation. For reasons they have laid out themselves, they have
had difficulty connecting these results to much of the conventional
"theory of investment," but this reflects defects in that theory.
The criticisms in this comment arise from holding the authors to an
idealized standard. We have little in the way offormal theory capable
of making predictions about observed data on investment and other
aggregate variables, particularly when sonle of the variables are price
variables. If Gordon and Veitch had gone some way toward providing
suchtheories, even ifonly simple models whose quantitative properties
could be compared with the data, their paper would have been better.348 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
I think they would have in this case been led to give us a more detailed
look at their regression and VAR data analysis. But good models in
this area will involve at least some elements of modeling dynamic
optimization under uncertainty, and such models, even apparently sim-
ple ones, are challenging to solve and understand. It will probably take
many economists, working over some years, to develop practically
fruitful ways of combining sophisticated, honest data analysis with
stochastic theory.
Reply Robert J. Gordon and John M. Veitch
Christopher Sims has contributed a constructive set ofcomments. We
agree with his characterizationofourpaperas achieving a clean display
of interesting empirical regularities, as well as with his criticism that,
holding us to an "idealized standard," he would have preferred that
some part had been devoted to developing simple models whose qual-
itative properties could have been compared with the data. Sims con-
tributes one example that he calls a "multiplier/expectational accel-
erator model" and discusses its implications for the decomposition of
variance in a hypothetical two-variable VAR model that includes only
consumption and investment. A related criticism is that our paper es-
timates only equations for investment rather than equations for both
investment and consumption.
In urging us to carry out a parallel study of consumption and in-
vestment, Sims can be interpreted as making a suggestion for future
research ratherthan a serious criticism ofthe presentpaper. Infocusing
on the four components of investment (which include consumer du-
rabIes expenditures), we were attempting to limit the scope of a long
and ambitious paperthat was primarily intended to provideanempirical
contrastbetweenexistingpostwarquarterly dataand ournewly created
set of quarterly expenditures data for the interwar period. To have
carried out a serious study of consumer expenditures on nondurable
goods and services would have poached on the turf of Robert Hall,
who has contributed a paper on that subject to this volume (chap. 4).
The systems properties of small VAR models for the whole economy,
including not only consumption expenditures but also the nature of
policy feedbacks from expenditures to government spending and the
money supply (alluded to by Sims in his section "MonetaristTheory"),
could be usefully studied in a sequel to this paper.
The purposeofthis rejoinderis toprovide some quantitativeevidence
to clothe the bare bones of Sims's conjectures regarding the implica-349 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
tions for multiplier/acceleratortheoryofa small two-by-two VAR model
containing equations only for aggregate investment and consumption.
Before proceeding with the exercise we must demur that limiting a
VAR model to just investment and consumption, without any separate
role for monetary variables, is inconsistent with the findings in our
paper that monetary shocks were important in both the interwar and
the postwar periods.
In what follows we shall maintain definitions that are consistent with
those in our paper, including consumer durables expenditures in "in-
vestment" and treating "consumption" as including only consumer
expenditures on nondurable goods and services. In the interpretation
that Sims suggests, evidence in support of the multiplier mechanism
would be basedonaninspectionofthe MAR (moving average response)
representation ofthe VAR model. We should expect to find a sustained
rise in consumption, probably larger than the rise in investment, fol-
lowing any shock to consumption residuals or investment residuals.
The results, shown in table C5.1, provide a partial confirmation of
Sims's conjectures for the interwar but not for the postwar period. In
the interwar two-by-two VAR model, a shock to either consumption
orinvestment generates a sustained response ofconsumption, confirm-
ing the multiplier mechanism, but also a response ofinvestment. How-
ever, in contrast to Sims's prediction, the response of consumption is
in no case appreciably larger than that ofinvestment. Behavior in the
Table C5.1 Moving Average Responses in Two-by-Two Investment
Consumption Model
Investment Innovation Consumption Innovation
Quarters after Shock Interwar Postwar Interwar Postwar
Investment response
4 1.55 0.71 0.89 0.08
8 1.31 0.29 1.12 -0.04
12 0.92 0.10 0.99 -0.06
16 0.65 0.06 0.80 -0.05
Consumption response
4 0.31 0.18 1.15 0.22
8 0.72 0.05 1.07 0.17
12 0.76 -0.05 0.98 0.11
16 0.67 -0.07 0.85 0.08
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postwar period is completely different, with very small responses ex-
cept for the response ofinvestment to its own innovations. A possible
reason for the difference between the interwar and postwar responses
involves theomitted monetary variables, whichin the GreatDepression
acted to amplify expenditure shocks but, at least in the second halfof
the postwar period, acted to counteract expenditure shocks.
The bottom section oftable C5.1 displays the decomposition ofvari-
ance (,'innovation accounting") for the two-by-two model in the same
format as table 5.8 in the paper. Here we see that, as in the larger
models discussed in the paper, the investment innovation accounts for
most of the variance of investment and a substantial fraction of the
variance ofconsumption, 45% in the interwar and 26% in the postwar
period. Sims may doubt the relevance of this result in light of his
multiplier/expectational accelerator model that makes investment ap-
pear to be driving consumption when in fact consumption disturbances
are the dominant source of variance. But we in turn may doubt the
relevance of his model, in which investment is free to jump instanta-
neously within the current quarter in response to a consumption shock
(allowing the investment innovation to "mask" the consumption shock),
in contrast to the real world, in which there are substantial gestation
lags in the investment process.
Finally, Sims is skeptical of our preference for aggregating the four
categories of investment along the structures/equipment dimension
ratherthanalong the household/business dimension. We have examined
the pattern oforthogonality ofthe disturbances in a four-variable VAR
model containing only the four components of investment. These re-
sults are displayed in table C5.2, which is in the same format as the
bottom part oftable 5.7 in the paper. The results are mixed. In addition
to the significant diagonal elements, we find examples of strong feed-
back from consumer durables (CD) to producers' durable equipment
(PDE) in the postwar period and from residential structures (RS) to
nonresidential structures (NRS) in the interwar period. These confirm
the structures/equipment pattern of aggregation. But there are other
elements that support the householdlbusiness pattern of aggregation,
including feedback from RS to DG in the postwar period and DG to
Table CS.2 Exogeneity Tests
DG PDE RS NRS
DG ***/*** /*** /
PDE /*** ***/*** /*** */
RS **/ ***/*** /*
NRS ***/ ***/ ***/***351 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
RS in the interwar, and weak feedback from NRS to PDE in the in-
terwar. The ambiguity of these results may suggest that investment
should be studied either with all four categories lumped together or
with each studied separately, with littlejustification for either two-way
aggregation scheme.
Discussion Summary
Allen Sinai suggested that the bulk ofthe analysis was at too aggregated
a level, andthis commentled the authors to devote much more attention
in the final version to the four components ofinvestment and to alter-
native aggregation schemes. Sinai also found the role played by real
balances interesting. Robert Eisner felt that the analysis confused out-
put expectations with a fixed distributed lag on past output. He argued
that such an expectational proxy was inadequate because the weights
on past output were likely to change over time. Olivier Blanchard felt
that the structural interpretation, given the results, was too strong and
would be valid only if investment were independent of contempora-
neous variables. Robert Hall believed that more structural information
on the investment process would be interesting but that identification
of the structure would require that additional exogenous variables be
found. He noted how hard it was to find such variables.
Mark Watson questioned the use of interpolated data in the prewar
and not the postwar period. He noted that the interpolated series were
essentially conditional expectations ofthe actual interpolated variables
and that consequently the second moments of the data were not the
same as the secondmoments ofthe conditionalexpectations. However,
he observed that explicit corrections could be made in the estimation
procedure.
John Veitch reported that to check the consistency between the pre-
war and postwar samples, he and Gordon had also used data for the
postwar period interpolated in the same manner as the prewar data and
found that the results (not reported in the conference version of the
paper) were not sensitive to this change. In regard to the issue of
contemporaneous correlations, Veitch suggested that the accounting
conventions of the Bureau of Economic Analysis made it much more
likely that investment in structures might be contemporaneously un-
correlated with other variables. As an example, he noted that current
housing starts inevitably appear in the income accounts as residential
investment for future quarters.352 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
References
Abel, Andrew B. 1979. Investment andthe value ofcapital. New York:
Garland.
Abel, Andrew B., and Olivier Blanchard. 1983. Investment and sales:
An empirical study. Paperpresentedat National Bureau ofEconomic
Research Macro Conference, July.
Auerbach, Alan J. 1983. Taxation, corporate financial policy, and the
costofcapital. JournalofEconomic Literature 21 (September): 905-
40.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1982. Adjustment costs, durables, and aggregate
consumption. Working Paper 1038, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
---. 1983a. Nonmonetary effects ofthe financial crisis in the prop-
agation of the Great Depression. American Economic Review 73
(June): 257-76.
---. 1983b. An equilibrium model ofindustrial employment, hours,
and earnings, 1923-1939. Working Papers in Economics E-83-19,
Hoover Institution.
Bischoff, Charles W. 1971. The effect of alternative lag distributions.
In Tax incentives and capital Spending, ed. Gary Fromm, 61-130.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Blanchard, Olivier J. 1981. What is left of the multiplier accelerator?
American Economic Review 71 (May): 150-54.
Bosworth, Barry. 1975. The stock market and the economy. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 6(2): 257-300.
Chirinko, Robert S. 1983a. Investment and tax policy: A survey of
existing models and empirical results with applications to the high-
technology sector. Report for the National Science Foundation, Di-
vision of Policy Research and Analysis.
---. 1983b. Investment, Tobin's Q, and multiple capital inputs. Pa-
perpresented to the Econometric Society wintermeetings, December.
Chirinko, Robert S., and Robert Eisner. 1983. Tax policy and invest-
ment in major U.S. econometric models. Journal ofPublic Econom-
ics 20 (March): 139-66.
Chow, Gregory C., and An-Ioh Lin. 1971. Best linear unbiased inter-
polation distribution and extrapolation of time series by related se-
ries. Review ofEconomics and Statistics 53 (November): 372-76.
Clark, J. Maurice. 1917. Business acceleration and the law ofdemand:
A technical factor in business cycles. Journal ofPolitical Economy
25 (March): 217-35.
Clark, Peter K. 1979. Investment in the 1970s: Theory, performance,
and prediction. Brookings Papers on EconomicActivity 10(1): 73-124.353 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
deLeeuw, Frank. 1971. The demand for housing: A review of cross-
section evidence. ReviewofEconomics andStatistics 53 (February):
1-10.
Eckstein, Otto. 1983. Disinflation. In Inflation: Prospects and reme-
dies, ed. W. D. Nordhaus. Alternatives for the 1980s, no. 10. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for National Policy.
Eisner, Robert. 1972. Components of capital expenditures: Replace-
ment and modernization versus expansion. Review ofEconomics
and Statistics 54 (August): 297-305.
Eisner, Robert, and M. I. Nadiri. 1968. Investment behavior and neo-
classical theory: A comment. Review ofEconomics and Statistics
50 (August): 369-82.
Eisner, Robert, and Robert H. Strotz. 1963. Determinants ofbusiness
investment. In Impacts ofmonetary policy, ed. Commission on Money
and Credit, 60-337. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Feldstein, Martin S. 1981. The distribution of the U.S. capital stock
between residential and industrial uses. Economic Inquiry 19 (Jan-
uary): 26-37.
Feldstein, Martin S., and David K. Foot. 1971. The other halfofgross
investment: Replacement and modernization expenditures. Review
ofEconomics and Statistics 53 (February): 49-58.
Feldstein, Martin S., and Michael Rothschild. 1974. Towards an eco-
nomic theory of replacement investment. Econometrica 42 (May):
393-424.
Fischer, Stanley, and Robert C. Merton. 1984. Macroeconomics and
finance: The role ofthe stock market. Working Paper 1291, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Fisher, F. M. 1969. The existence of aggregate production functions.
Econometrica 37:553-77.
Friedman, Milton, and David Meiselman. 1963. The relative stability
of monetary velocity and the investment multiplier in the United
States, 1897-1958, In Stabilization policies, ed. Commission on
Money and Credit. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A monetary history of
the United States, 1867-1%0. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
---. 1970. Monetary statistics of the United States: Estimates,
sources, and methods. New York: Colu:mbia University Press.
Garber, Peter M., and Robert G. King. 1983. Deep structural exca-
vation? A critique of Euler equation methods, Technical Paper 31,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Geweke, J. F. 1983. The superneutrality ofmoney in the United States:
An interpretation of the evidence. Working Paper, Duke Univer-
sity.354 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
Gordon, Robert A. 1951. Cyclical experience in the interwar period:
The investment boom of the twenties. In Conference on Business
Cycles, 163-214. New York: National Bureau ofEconomic Research.
Gordon, Robert J. 1973. Interest rates and prices in the long run: A com-
ment. Journal ofMoney, Credit, andBanking 5 (February): 460-63.
---. 1977. Can the inflation of the 1970s be explained? Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 8(1): 253-77.
---. 1982. Price inertia and policy ineffectiveness in the United
States, 1890-1980. Journal of Political Economy 90 (December):
1087-1117.
---. 1983a. "Credibility" vs. "Mainstream": Two views of the
inflation process. In Inflation: Prospects and remedies, ed. W. D.
Nordhaus, 25-34. Alternatives for the 1980s, no. 10. Washington,
D.C.: Center for National Policy.
---. 1983b. The conduct of domestic monetary policy. Working
Paper 1221, National Bureau of Economic Research.
---. 1984a. Macroeconomics. 3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown.
---. 1984b. Inflation in the recovery. Paper presented to a meeting
ofacademic consultants with the Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal
Reserve System, May.
Gordon, Robert J., and Stephen R. King. 1982. The output cost of
disinflation in traditional and vector autoregressive models. Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity 13(1): 205-42.
Gordon, Robert J., and James A. Wilcox. 1981. Monetarist interpre-
tations of the Great Depression: Evaluation and critique. In The
Great Depression revisited, ed. Karl Brunner, 49-107. Boston: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff.
Grebler, Leo, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick. 1956. Capital for-
mation in residential real estate: Trends and prospects. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Hall, Robert E. 1977. Investment, interest rates, and the effects of
stabilization policies. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 8(1):
61-103.
---. 1978. Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent in-
come hypothesis: Theory and evidence. Journal ofPolitical Econ-
omy 86:971-88.
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1967. Tax policy and invest-
ment behavior. American Economic Review 57 (June): 391-414.
---. 1971. Application of the theory of optimum capital accumu-
lation. In Tax incentives and capital spending, ed. G. Fromm, 9-60.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Hansen, Lars P., and Kenneth J. Singleton. 1982. Generalized instru-
mental variables estimation of nonlinear rational expectations models.
Econometrica 50 (September): 1269-86.355 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Hayashi, Fumio. 1982. Tobin's marginal q andaverage q. Econo,lletrica
50 (January): 213-24.
Helliwell, John F. 1976. Aggregate investment equations: A survey of
issues. In Aggregate investment: Selected issues, ed. J. Helliwell,
13-53. London: Penguin Education.
Hickman, Bert G. 1973. What became ofthe building cycle? In Nations
andhouseholds in economic growth: Essays in honorofMoses Abra-
movitz, ed. Paul David and Melvin Reder. New York: Academic
Press.
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1963. Capital theory and investment behavior.
American Economic Review 53 (May): 247-59.
---. 1967. The theory of investment behavior. In Determinants of
investment behaviour, ed. R. Ferber, 129-55. Universities-National
Bureau Conference Series no. 18. New York: Columbia University
Press.
---. 1971. Econometric studies ofinvestment behavior: A survey.
Journal ofEconomic Literature 9 (DeceInber): 1111-47.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and James A. Stephenson. 1967. The time struc-
ture ofinvestment behavior in U.S. manufacturing, 1947-1960. Re-
view ofEconomics and Statistics 49 (February): 16-27.
---. 1969. Issues in the development of the neoclassical theory of
investment behavior. Review ofEcononlics and Statistics 51 (Au-
gust): 346-53.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Martin Sullivan. 1981. Inflation and corporate
capital recovery. In Depreciation, inflation, and the taxation ofin-
come from capital, ed. Charles R. Hulten, 171-237. Washington,
D.C.: Urban Institute Press.
Keynes, John Neville. 1890. The scope and methodofpolitical econ-
omy. London: Macmillan.
King, Stephen R. 1983. Macroeconomic activity and the real rate of
interest. Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University.
Litterman, Robert A. 1981. A random walk, Markov model for the
interpolation of time series. Working Paper 190, Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1967. Adjustent costs and the theory of supply.
Journal ofPolitical Economy 75 (August): 321-34.
---. 1976. Econometricpolicy evaluation: Acritique. In The Phillips
curve and labor markets, ed. Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, 19-
46. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 1. Am-
sterdam: North-Holland.
Malinvaud, Edmond. 1982. Wages and unemployment. EconomicJour-
nal92 (March): 1-12.
Mayer, Thomas. 1980. Consumption in the Great Depression. Journal
ofPolitical Economy 86 (January): 139-·45.356 Robert J. Gordon/John M. Veitch
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1978. The household balance sheet and the Great
Depression. Journal ofEconomic History 38:918-37.
Modigliani, Franco, and Richard A. Cohn. 1979. Inflation, rational val-
uation and the market. Financial Analysts Journal (March/April),
3-23.
Muellbauer, J. 1975. Aggregation, income distribution and consumer
demand. Review ofEconomic Studies 42 525-43.
Musgrave, John C. 1979. Durable goods owned by consumers in the
United States, 1925-77. Survey of Current Business 59 (March):
17-25.
Perry, George L. 1983. Whathave we learnedaboutdisinflation?Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity 14(2): 587-602.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell. 1977. The demand for housing: A study in spec-
ification and grouping, Econometrica 45 (March): 447-61.
Roosa, Robert. 1951. Interest rates and the central bank. In Money,
trade, and economic Growth: Essays in HonorofJohn H. Williams,
270-95. New York: Macmillan.
Samuelson, Paul. 1939. A synthesis ofthe principle ofacceleration and
the multiplier. JournalofPolitical Economy 47 (December): 786-97.
Shiller, Robert. 1981. Do stock prices move too much to be justified
by subsequent changes in dividends? American Economic Review
71(3): 421-36.
Sims, Christopher A. 1980a. Macroeconomics and reality. Econome-
trica 48 (January): 1-48.
---. 1980b. Comparison of interwar and postwar business cycles:
Monetarism reconsidered. American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings 70(2): 250-57.
--. 1981. An autoregression index model for the U.S., 1948-1975.
In Large-scale macro-econometric models, ed. J. Kmenta and J. B.
Ramsey. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
---. 1982. Policy analysis with econometric models. Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity 13(1): 107-64.
---. 1983. Is there a monetary business cycle? American Economic
Review 73 (May): 228-33.
Summers, Lawrence H. 1981. Taxation and corporate investment: A
q-theory approach. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 12(1):
67-127.
Swanson, J., and S. Williamson. 1971. Estimates of national product
and income for the U.S. economy, 1919-41. Working Paper 71-32,
Department of Economics, University of Iowa.
Tax Foundation. 1979. Facts andfigures on governmentfinance. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Tax Foundation.
Taylor, John. 1983. Optimal stabilization rules in a stochastic model of
investmentwith gestationlags. Working Paper 1225, National Bureau
of Economic Research.357 Fixed Investment in the American Business Cycle, 1919-83
Temin, Peter. 1976. Did monetaryforces cause the Great Depression?
New York: Norton.
U.S. Bureau ofthe Census. 1965. The statistical history ofthe United
Statesfrom colonial times to the present. Stamford, Conn.: Fairfield.
U.S. DepartmentofCommerce. 1981. The nationalincome andproduct
accounts ofthe U.S., 1929-76. Supplement to the Survey ofCurrent
Business, September.
Wilcox, James A. 1983. Disaggregating data using related series. Jour-
nal ofBusiness and Economic Statistics (July), 187-91.
Yellen, Janet, 1980. Jorgensonian investment theory: The case of the
missing wage rate. Working Paper, U"niversity of California at
Berkeley.